Two Issues in Conservatism
It strikes me that there are two issues that may be puzzling. The first is conservatism without God. I think some people may wonder about that, thinking that you have to have old-time religion to be conservative. In fact, I believe that many of them think the notion of atheistic conservatism is eccentric or even nonsensical. In fact, the opposite is true; the status of conservatism is logically unrelated to God. So, I'll have a post about that in a while.
The other issue is a thornier and not entirely clear to me yet. It is that conservatism is not on the right, as opposed to the left. If been told several times by people wiser than me that the connection between conservatism and "the right" is a ruse perpetrated by the left. A regular named Jerry ("jerry") over at Roger Simon's site told me this a year or two ago, for example, saying that "right" was coined by Stalin to distinguish himself from other leftists with whom he was incompetion. What makes the issue even more interesting is that "left" must disappear when we dissolve "right" into nonsensehood. Anyway, I'm not the historian that Jerry is. But I am a philosopher, and I have something to say about the matter. It does seem to me that the philosophical status of conservatism is not to the right in any sense at all. There will be a lot to think when we get to that post, as we will do soon.
Meanwhile, youse chew these two issues over on your own. Then stop by.
Also, I'll be continuing my series of short studies of the works of John Kekes. First up will be his recent The Art of Life. John Kekes is the greatest American conservative philosopher (though I admit that that's not saying much.) Peruse my archives for posts presenting his ideas.
Tuesday, July 25, 2006
No, Seriously, Bigwig's Back
It's unbelievable. He's even serving up the stories. These stories are compiled into a book in my mind called "Guy Stuff". Many of them are really about my daily experiences, not his, and I don't know how he found out about them. All of them are fun to read.
But let's hope he keeps up the current-events analysis. Like I say, no one can crawl up someone's asshole with a microscope like Bigwig can. Plus he makes inferences that no one else seems to be able to notice until he does.
It's unbelievable. He's even serving up the stories. These stories are compiled into a book in my mind called "Guy Stuff". Many of them are really about my daily experiences, not his, and I don't know how he found out about them. All of them are fun to read.
But let's hope he keeps up the current-events analysis. Like I say, no one can crawl up someone's asshole with a microscope like Bigwig can. Plus he makes inferences that no one else seems to be able to notice until he does.
Saturday, July 22, 2006
Flipper Babies
Richard Chappell asserts, just as my good friend Bob does, that it's okay to produce a person with injuries as long as that person's life is worth living. But he assumes that "the damage is moderate enough that the resulting life would still be well worth living." Notice the terms "moderate" and "well" there.
Take flipper babies, babies born with stubby arms and legs due to thalydomide poisoning. Suppose the baby has no arms or legs (or whichever horrific ailment you've supposed.) It doesn't matter how, but imagine the harm is grievous enough to make the life just barely worth living. Death by 12. Frequent pain. Minimal ability to function. But, as luck would have it, activity providing enough entertainment to register a lackluster and dreary "acceptable" on the scale of goodness of life. By no means deeply satisfying. By no means.
Now, if you knew that this was the only sort of baby you could conceive, then your choice to do it would seem to be wrong, at least by my lights. The child's looking you in the face and saying in anguish, "How could you do this to me papa?" would make sense. "But I love you and you're all I could make." "I know you love me papa." Then the head turns away. You chose to make it the case that someone has no arms or legs. You chose to make it the case that someone has a life only barely worth living. You did wrong. At least, it isn't clear that you did not, and Richard hasn't proven other wise.
The practical point of this business, to me, is sperm bank conception. It seems to me a grievous injury to choose to make it the case that someone has a father who doesn't ever love, ever see, or ever want to see him. The harm seems grievous enough to make this form of conception wrong. (Check my little series of posts over at Right Reason.)
Here my point is just that it is not in the clear that it's okay to do harm to someone as long as that he doesn't exist yet and the harm is necessary to create him. Richard's Pinnochio example doesn't do anything to refute that contention.
By the way, if you like philosophy blogs, you'll love Richard's.
Richard Chappell asserts, just as my good friend Bob does, that it's okay to produce a person with injuries as long as that person's life is worth living. But he assumes that "the damage is moderate enough that the resulting life would still be well worth living." Notice the terms "moderate" and "well" there.
Take flipper babies, babies born with stubby arms and legs due to thalydomide poisoning. Suppose the baby has no arms or legs (or whichever horrific ailment you've supposed.) It doesn't matter how, but imagine the harm is grievous enough to make the life just barely worth living. Death by 12. Frequent pain. Minimal ability to function. But, as luck would have it, activity providing enough entertainment to register a lackluster and dreary "acceptable" on the scale of goodness of life. By no means deeply satisfying. By no means.
Now, if you knew that this was the only sort of baby you could conceive, then your choice to do it would seem to be wrong, at least by my lights. The child's looking you in the face and saying in anguish, "How could you do this to me papa?" would make sense. "But I love you and you're all I could make." "I know you love me papa." Then the head turns away. You chose to make it the case that someone has no arms or legs. You chose to make it the case that someone has a life only barely worth living. You did wrong. At least, it isn't clear that you did not, and Richard hasn't proven other wise.
The practical point of this business, to me, is sperm bank conception. It seems to me a grievous injury to choose to make it the case that someone has a father who doesn't ever love, ever see, or ever want to see him. The harm seems grievous enough to make this form of conception wrong. (Check my little series of posts over at Right Reason.)
Here my point is just that it is not in the clear that it's okay to do harm to someone as long as that he doesn't exist yet and the harm is necessary to create him. Richard's Pinnochio example doesn't do anything to refute that contention.
By the way, if you like philosophy blogs, you'll love Richard's.
Bigwig's Back Some
It's good to see Bigwig analyzing current events for us. In the past he has demonstrated uncanny and unique powers of insight into them.
It's good to see Bigwig analyzing current events for us. In the past he has demonstrated uncanny and unique powers of insight into them.
Friday, July 21, 2006
God and Adulthood
Belief in God is a way of clinging to a vestige of childhood. Atheism is full adulthood. Neither is more praiseworthy than the other, so don't get me wrong. The vestige of childhood that theists cling to is just a dream, an idle fancy, that does not need to have deleterious effect on their character (their backbone, independence, self-reliance, or the like.) Likewise rejecting this vestige and embracing atheism do not improve one's character. They are simply more realistic attitudes toward something that has little practical importance.
God has little practical importance, you see. Many theists would agree. They think that God bids them make up their own minds about what to do. Even when they claim that God shows them what to do, their decisions about how to act are indistinguishable from independent decisions, there being no evidence that God helps them make the decisions.
So, I have nothing polemical to say and I don't mean to denigrate theism. My point is that atheism is the recognition that if your loved ones die there is no one there for you. There is only rocks. What human beings do matters to no one else because no one is there. In particular, there is no one whom we devoutly wish to please and show our adoration and aspiration to be equal. He's not there to show pride in us. There is no harmony or orchestration of human life within a meaningful higher order. There is a higher order, but it isn't meaningful; it's physics. Atheism is like the death of your parents. Dad's dead. There's no one there now. Just you. Your kids need and love you, but you have no one.
What is interesting is whether this makes life pointless. Many theists would say that it does. But it does not. It is rational to attempt to fulfill your large and complexly orchestrated set of desires, is it not? You don't need a divine parent overseeing the matter to make it worthwhile to do so. Or if you do, then God's life is drearily meaningless, as he has no parent. One might utter some Aristotelian mumbo jumbo about God being necessary or creating himself, but even so, he still wouldn't have anyone else to be proud of him or love him. He would be all alone.
In any event, there is a certain adulthood in recognizing that the parent is not there, in accepting that only oneself is there to oversee one's thoughts and actions.
Belief in God is a way of clinging to a vestige of childhood. Atheism is full adulthood. Neither is more praiseworthy than the other, so don't get me wrong. The vestige of childhood that theists cling to is just a dream, an idle fancy, that does not need to have deleterious effect on their character (their backbone, independence, self-reliance, or the like.) Likewise rejecting this vestige and embracing atheism do not improve one's character. They are simply more realistic attitudes toward something that has little practical importance.
God has little practical importance, you see. Many theists would agree. They think that God bids them make up their own minds about what to do. Even when they claim that God shows them what to do, their decisions about how to act are indistinguishable from independent decisions, there being no evidence that God helps them make the decisions.
So, I have nothing polemical to say and I don't mean to denigrate theism. My point is that atheism is the recognition that if your loved ones die there is no one there for you. There is only rocks. What human beings do matters to no one else because no one is there. In particular, there is no one whom we devoutly wish to please and show our adoration and aspiration to be equal. He's not there to show pride in us. There is no harmony or orchestration of human life within a meaningful higher order. There is a higher order, but it isn't meaningful; it's physics. Atheism is like the death of your parents. Dad's dead. There's no one there now. Just you. Your kids need and love you, but you have no one.
What is interesting is whether this makes life pointless. Many theists would say that it does. But it does not. It is rational to attempt to fulfill your large and complexly orchestrated set of desires, is it not? You don't need a divine parent overseeing the matter to make it worthwhile to do so. Or if you do, then God's life is drearily meaningless, as he has no parent. One might utter some Aristotelian mumbo jumbo about God being necessary or creating himself, but even so, he still wouldn't have anyone else to be proud of him or love him. He would be all alone.
In any event, there is a certain adulthood in recognizing that the parent is not there, in accepting that only oneself is there to oversee one's thoughts and actions.
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
Stem Cells
If the argument against fetal stem cell research is based upon the view that destroying the embryo (as a result of conducting scientific experiments on it) is the taking of a person's life, then this assumes that it is murder. It also follows that destroying the embryo without using it for scientific experiments is murder. Similarly, the view that all abortion is murder follows (as long as you assume, as I do, that there is no successful defense against this implication based on the right of the mother not to have a parasite use her body.)
So, the argument against stem-cell research has to assume that the brainless cells in question are people, if the argument is about murder. This is a difficult position to maintain, given that many cells are similarly brainless yet not people: liver cells, skin cells. And these also can get brains with the cloning technology we will get in the future. Or, at least, the contingency of technological possibility there should not matter. Even if the technology is forever beyond us to clone a person with a brain from a liver cell, it is in principle possible, as possible as it is for an embryo to become such a being. In short, if brainless embryos are people, then all human cells are people. Both need certain conditions to bring about the fruition. Both have very similar, complex internal mechanisms that will bring it about under the respective conditions. That the embryo is an organism does not appear to be relevant.
On the other hand, in this connection the amount of medical research that could come from fetal stem cells is irrelevant if the embroy is a person. We may not kill people for medical research. So, the appeal to medical usefulness is misguided. Still, though it's misguided, it is aimed at a weak argument: that destroying a certain kind of cell is murder.
If, on the other hand, destroying an embryo is not murder, then neither is abortion in the stage before there is brain tissue. Perhaps, rather, the argument is that it is just immoral to destroy human organisms even when they are not yet people and do not yet have brains. This is a reasonable argument. There is something unseemly about destroying human fertilized eggs. It may even be immoral, after the fashion of buying great art, taking it home, and burning it for fun. But whether this should be illegal is hard to say. It's an open question, though I would not be in favor of this infringement of liberty when what is at stake morally is not clear but merely "unseemly."
To this argument, the medical usefulness of fetal stem cells is relevant. But again the argument from unseemliness is anything but clearly well-founded. Why bring up the extraneous matter of the usefulness of scientific research? How can you weigh the value of the future, unknown research against the value of keeping non-person human organisms alive? These are imponderables.
So, the debate is uninteresting to me. None of the arguments is interesting. Only one has obvious weight, namely, the argument that a cell without a brain is not a person and therefore cannot be murdered. So, I'm not interested in the topic. By all means, default to liberty here and oppose prohibitions on the research. And cutting off government funds is close enough to such a prohibition as long as our medical research system is as socialized as it is.
If the argument against fetal stem cell research is based upon the view that destroying the embryo (as a result of conducting scientific experiments on it) is the taking of a person's life, then this assumes that it is murder. It also follows that destroying the embryo without using it for scientific experiments is murder. Similarly, the view that all abortion is murder follows (as long as you assume, as I do, that there is no successful defense against this implication based on the right of the mother not to have a parasite use her body.)
So, the argument against stem-cell research has to assume that the brainless cells in question are people, if the argument is about murder. This is a difficult position to maintain, given that many cells are similarly brainless yet not people: liver cells, skin cells. And these also can get brains with the cloning technology we will get in the future. Or, at least, the contingency of technological possibility there should not matter. Even if the technology is forever beyond us to clone a person with a brain from a liver cell, it is in principle possible, as possible as it is for an embryo to become such a being. In short, if brainless embryos are people, then all human cells are people. Both need certain conditions to bring about the fruition. Both have very similar, complex internal mechanisms that will bring it about under the respective conditions. That the embryo is an organism does not appear to be relevant.
On the other hand, in this connection the amount of medical research that could come from fetal stem cells is irrelevant if the embroy is a person. We may not kill people for medical research. So, the appeal to medical usefulness is misguided. Still, though it's misguided, it is aimed at a weak argument: that destroying a certain kind of cell is murder.
If, on the other hand, destroying an embryo is not murder, then neither is abortion in the stage before there is brain tissue. Perhaps, rather, the argument is that it is just immoral to destroy human organisms even when they are not yet people and do not yet have brains. This is a reasonable argument. There is something unseemly about destroying human fertilized eggs. It may even be immoral, after the fashion of buying great art, taking it home, and burning it for fun. But whether this should be illegal is hard to say. It's an open question, though I would not be in favor of this infringement of liberty when what is at stake morally is not clear but merely "unseemly."
To this argument, the medical usefulness of fetal stem cells is relevant. But again the argument from unseemliness is anything but clearly well-founded. Why bring up the extraneous matter of the usefulness of scientific research? How can you weigh the value of the future, unknown research against the value of keeping non-person human organisms alive? These are imponderables.
So, the debate is uninteresting to me. None of the arguments is interesting. Only one has obvious weight, namely, the argument that a cell without a brain is not a person and therefore cannot be murdered. So, I'm not interested in the topic. By all means, default to liberty here and oppose prohibitions on the research. And cutting off government funds is close enough to such a prohibition as long as our medical research system is as socialized as it is.
Sunday, July 16, 2006
Huh?
Sheesh. Just when I thought I'd seen enough moronitude, there's these guy's. You know, if you have a sense of humor that likes potty jokes, the Phil Hendrie Show, or pure piffle, I just don't know what to say about you. And yet I cannot look away.
Sheesh. Just when I thought I'd seen enough moronitude, there's these guy's. You know, if you have a sense of humor that likes potty jokes, the Phil Hendrie Show, or pure piffle, I just don't know what to say about you. And yet I cannot look away.
God
Has this been said? The reason I'm an atheist is straightforward. The proposition that there is a god is as unlikely as ghosts, Martians amongst us, and reincarnation. There isn't the slightest evidence for these hypotheses which fly in the face of so much else that we know to be true. So I believe all of them to be false.
I admire religious belief in God. Most religions I find beautiful and noble.
And yet there are few atheists. And most atheists don't fancy religion.
Has this been said? The reason I'm an atheist is straightforward. The proposition that there is a god is as unlikely as ghosts, Martians amongst us, and reincarnation. There isn't the slightest evidence for these hypotheses which fly in the face of so much else that we know to be true. So I believe all of them to be false.
I admire religious belief in God. Most religions I find beautiful and noble.
And yet there are few atheists. And most atheists don't fancy religion.
Being Fun
Many, many years ago (2002 or 2003), blogger Michael Blowhard posted about something like this: Why are lefty/liberal types more fun?
It takes a bit of grit in the oyster to make a pearl. Lighten up. There's the rub.
The look on the face of the lefty/liberal says, "I'm not going to take the central task of life very seriously. In fact, I don't even have a grasp on it at all. I can relegate it to "be kind," and be done with it. Let's get on with enjoyments that are cut away from these encumbrances. In fact, I'm not even thinking of these encumbrances at all. Are you? I hardly feel them."
There is a set of dispositions, inclinations, that come to the fore when one unburdens oneself of conserving the precious heritage of virtue. They are exhilarating frequently exhilarating, unlike the sensations offered by the recreational intentions of the man who considers it to be the case that outside of the burden of conserving virtuous ways of life there is nothing else inspiring. They open up possibilities of behavior not likely considered by him. I'm not talking about porn and drugs. This has nothing to do with the titillation of immoral behavior. It has to do with the possibilities opened up by shattering the fragile edifice that is our traditional ways of life. There may be untold heights to be soared thence. Who knows? Go to a party of lefty's. Feel this.
What lies on the other side, however, may be more exhilarating: The prospect of a life well lived. (Of course, lefty folk can live lives well. But that is not their usual intention. Their usual intention is to enjoy life and to make a difference.) When your goal is a life well-lived, you tend to be less that exhilarating to meet. You offer no relief from the burden. You dwell in the hum-drum, where a life well-lived must dwell. Even if I am as conservative as you, you less often offer a moment's relief from my own burden than a lefty friend, who takes me outside the box right away, will do. I want grit. I want to say, "Aw, fuck it." You can't say that when you take your burden seriously. It's heavy. You can't lighten up.
Michael was right that more needs to be said about this.
Many, many years ago (2002 or 2003), blogger Michael Blowhard posted about something like this: Why are lefty/liberal types more fun?
It takes a bit of grit in the oyster to make a pearl. Lighten up. There's the rub.
The look on the face of the lefty/liberal says, "I'm not going to take the central task of life very seriously. In fact, I don't even have a grasp on it at all. I can relegate it to "be kind," and be done with it. Let's get on with enjoyments that are cut away from these encumbrances. In fact, I'm not even thinking of these encumbrances at all. Are you? I hardly feel them."
There is a set of dispositions, inclinations, that come to the fore when one unburdens oneself of conserving the precious heritage of virtue. They are exhilarating frequently exhilarating, unlike the sensations offered by the recreational intentions of the man who considers it to be the case that outside of the burden of conserving virtuous ways of life there is nothing else inspiring. They open up possibilities of behavior not likely considered by him. I'm not talking about porn and drugs. This has nothing to do with the titillation of immoral behavior. It has to do with the possibilities opened up by shattering the fragile edifice that is our traditional ways of life. There may be untold heights to be soared thence. Who knows? Go to a party of lefty's. Feel this.
What lies on the other side, however, may be more exhilarating: The prospect of a life well lived. (Of course, lefty folk can live lives well. But that is not their usual intention. Their usual intention is to enjoy life and to make a difference.) When your goal is a life well-lived, you tend to be less that exhilarating to meet. You offer no relief from the burden. You dwell in the hum-drum, where a life well-lived must dwell. Even if I am as conservative as you, you less often offer a moment's relief from my own burden than a lefty friend, who takes me outside the box right away, will do. I want grit. I want to say, "Aw, fuck it." You can't say that when you take your burden seriously. It's heavy. You can't lighten up.
Michael was right that more needs to be said about this.
Two More Things about Nihilism
Alright, I post about nihilism some. Okay, a lot. One of my fellow bloggers over at Right Reason (I hardly knew ye...) said I was a nihilist albeit a conservative. Anyways. Two points more.
The first is that a healthy (or more precisely, virtuous) adjustment to life requires, as they say, “not taking things too seriously.” It requires steeling oneself to the hard nocks of outrageous fortune. It requires equanimity and composure when most people would find it astonishing that one is able to exhibit them. It resembles the grizzled jadedness of the nihilist. You have to “take things in stride.” Again, as they say. They say these things because they’re right.
The loss of what matters most will happen. You must be able to take it. You must resemble the nihilist. He doesn’t care about it.
This resemblance is not merely superficial. Both virtue and nihilism understand that this is all there is. There is nothing else. You will not be bailed out. Virtue lies precisely in being able to produce an admirable life with the deeply flawed hand that reality deals us. The Pollyanna hasn’t the tools to produce virtue. Even the person whose expectations lie between the realist and the Pollyanna does not. When he gets hit with what he scoffed at as only worth the pessimist’s planning for, he is unable to produce an admirable response. But he shares with the realist an upbeat attitude nevertheless. Virtue is not pessimistic.
The other thing about nihilism is that, as I replied to my fellow blogger, I not only reject nihilism, but there is nothing that I would count as evidence that it is true. We have a large and coherent set of desires and there is a large set of ways of life that we find fulfilling of these desires. The desires are manifold and well-knit together, along with the ways forming culture. It is possible for many of us to succeed for the most part in exemplifying this culture, this fulfillment, in various ways peculiarly suited to our individual tastes. Given that fact, nothing counts as evidence that nihilism is so. Not death, not the absence of a god or afterlife. Nihilism is a confusion, therefore.
Alright, I post about nihilism some. Okay, a lot. One of my fellow bloggers over at Right Reason (I hardly knew ye...) said I was a nihilist albeit a conservative. Anyways. Two points more.
The first is that a healthy (or more precisely, virtuous) adjustment to life requires, as they say, “not taking things too seriously.” It requires steeling oneself to the hard nocks of outrageous fortune. It requires equanimity and composure when most people would find it astonishing that one is able to exhibit them. It resembles the grizzled jadedness of the nihilist. You have to “take things in stride.” Again, as they say. They say these things because they’re right.
The loss of what matters most will happen. You must be able to take it. You must resemble the nihilist. He doesn’t care about it.
This resemblance is not merely superficial. Both virtue and nihilism understand that this is all there is. There is nothing else. You will not be bailed out. Virtue lies precisely in being able to produce an admirable life with the deeply flawed hand that reality deals us. The Pollyanna hasn’t the tools to produce virtue. Even the person whose expectations lie between the realist and the Pollyanna does not. When he gets hit with what he scoffed at as only worth the pessimist’s planning for, he is unable to produce an admirable response. But he shares with the realist an upbeat attitude nevertheless. Virtue is not pessimistic.
The other thing about nihilism is that, as I replied to my fellow blogger, I not only reject nihilism, but there is nothing that I would count as evidence that it is true. We have a large and coherent set of desires and there is a large set of ways of life that we find fulfilling of these desires. The desires are manifold and well-knit together, along with the ways forming culture. It is possible for many of us to succeed for the most part in exemplifying this culture, this fulfillment, in various ways peculiarly suited to our individual tastes. Given that fact, nothing counts as evidence that nihilism is so. Not death, not the absence of a god or afterlife. Nihilism is a confusion, therefore.
Monday, November 21, 2005
OT: Air America
Okay, I listened to Air America last night.
Randi Rhodes said that the House had only narrowly defeated the motion to pull the troops out of Iraq. The vote two-hundred-something to two hundred something, she said, with several Republicans crossing over. Maybe she was thinking of the narrowly-passed budget bill which had a vote of 216-215. The vote to pull out of Iraq was defeated 403 to 3. Anyway, Rhodes took the closeness of what she thought was the vote to indicate that "it's over" for Bush's war and that he should get out and "not let the door hit him where the Good Lord split him." Maybe there was some other vote on Iraq on November 19th or 20th that I'm not aware of. Otherwise. Rhodes embarrassed herself.
Later a host name Laura came on. She said she was going to give an alternative Iraq policy. I was pleased. I eagerly awaited some healthy, substantive deliberation between left and right over Iraq. But then she stated that to this end she would enlist the thought of Gore Vidal, Robert Scheer, and Ted Rall.
Oh, well.
Okay, I listened to Air America last night.
Randi Rhodes said that the House had only narrowly defeated the motion to pull the troops out of Iraq. The vote two-hundred-something to two hundred something, she said, with several Republicans crossing over. Maybe she was thinking of the narrowly-passed budget bill which had a vote of 216-215. The vote to pull out of Iraq was defeated 403 to 3. Anyway, Rhodes took the closeness of what she thought was the vote to indicate that "it's over" for Bush's war and that he should get out and "not let the door hit him where the Good Lord split him." Maybe there was some other vote on Iraq on November 19th or 20th that I'm not aware of. Otherwise. Rhodes embarrassed herself.
Later a host name Laura came on. She said she was going to give an alternative Iraq policy. I was pleased. I eagerly awaited some healthy, substantive deliberation between left and right over Iraq. But then she stated that to this end she would enlist the thought of Gore Vidal, Robert Scheer, and Ted Rall.
Oh, well.
Thursday, November 17, 2005
Natural Law Theory is a Kind of Divine Command Theory
Natural Law Theory holds that beings such as us have ends from which our obligations may be inferred. I'll give you an example.
Suppose a natural law theorist holds, as he is apt to do, that homosexuality is wrong because heterosexuality is our natural purpose. This is to say that our natures are such that homosexuality is unnatural behavior for us and therefore immoral.
The obvious and common retort is to charge natural law theory with the naturalistic fallacy. This is to charge that it invalidly infers from the fact that something is unnatural in some biological sense to the conclusion that it is wrong. The reply from the natural law theorist is that the inference is indeed valid because here by "biological" we include the notion of God's creation.
However, this reply is just to say that we may infer our moral obligations from what is natural because God has chosen which things to make the natural things.
Another example will help. A natural law theorist is liable to argue that a human embryo is a rational being and therefore, in spite of the fact that it has not brain, has a mind and a right to be treated as any human being with a mind ought to be treated. His reasoning is that the embryo is rational in that its nature has been selected to be such that it will someday reason. His reasoning is not that the embryo has a genetic tendency to go on to become rational. The difference between these two kinds of reasoning is that the natural law theorist's reasoning assumes that God's choosing a thing's natural tendencies give that thing its end. In other words, it is only because of God's choice that the being in question has such and such an end. That is the Divine Command Theory.
Natural Law Theory holds that beings such as us have ends from which our obligations may be inferred. I'll give you an example.
Suppose a natural law theorist holds, as he is apt to do, that homosexuality is wrong because heterosexuality is our natural purpose. This is to say that our natures are such that homosexuality is unnatural behavior for us and therefore immoral.
The obvious and common retort is to charge natural law theory with the naturalistic fallacy. This is to charge that it invalidly infers from the fact that something is unnatural in some biological sense to the conclusion that it is wrong. The reply from the natural law theorist is that the inference is indeed valid because here by "biological" we include the notion of God's creation.
However, this reply is just to say that we may infer our moral obligations from what is natural because God has chosen which things to make the natural things.
Another example will help. A natural law theorist is liable to argue that a human embryo is a rational being and therefore, in spite of the fact that it has not brain, has a mind and a right to be treated as any human being with a mind ought to be treated. His reasoning is that the embryo is rational in that its nature has been selected to be such that it will someday reason. His reasoning is not that the embryo has a genetic tendency to go on to become rational. The difference between these two kinds of reasoning is that the natural law theorist's reasoning assumes that God's choosing a thing's natural tendencies give that thing its end. In other words, it is only because of God's choice that the being in question has such and such an end. That is the Divine Command Theory.
Iraq War
Just a bit of refereeing the "debate." I say that with scare quotes because it isn't really a debate. There has never been a plausible moral case against the liberation.
1. A point of logic. The carping by the American left continues unabated. It is stupendous in its nonsense. Let's consider the claim, "Iraq had nothing to do with terrorism."
It makes no sense to say that Iraq had nothing to do with terrorism. It begs the question so blatantly that it should take your breath away when anyone whose job it is to consider these issues says this. Bush gave an argument that it does have something to do with terrorism. You can't just deny his claim without refuting his argument.
But you can't refute the argument: With an oppressed Middle East, the terrorists can win. But with a free Middle East living under rule of decent laws, they can't win. Iraq was by far and away the best place to start the liberation, for geographical, strategic and historical reasons.
2. A Moral Constraint on the "Debate." There has never been a plausible moral argument against the liberation. This is for obvious reasons. It is impossible to refute the claim that it is permissible to liberate 25 million people from a mass-murdering tyrant whose heirs were psychopathic sadists. You'd have to show that the invasion would kill as many or more than the tyrannical regime would kill given another 30 years' reign.
It is impossible to refute the claim that a mass-murdering tyrant with a WMD program, who has liassons with terrorists and shares with them the same enmity towards us, and who therefore could help those terrorists put WMD in an American city, should not be violently deposed by us.
3. Miscellany.There have been plausible arguments from prudence that liberating Iraq was too much against American self-interest to count as prudent. But I don't think those arguments succeeded, and anyway they are beside the point. Those arguments are for military strategists to evaluate; I'm not qualified. They are not philosophical or moral topics.
By the way, I was once scolded by a anonymous journal referee for using the term "self-interest." He considered it obfuscating jargon, preferring I say "interest." But that's not right. I have self-interests and non-instrumental interests in others' welfare. Both are interests. An argument from prudence against an action that will help others attempts to show that the sacrifice to the agent is too great. It attempts to show that, though morally permissible (and supererogatory, or "above and beyond the call of duty") the action is too great a sacrifice to be considered rational.
Saturday, November 05, 2005
Intelligent Design Theory
One side says it's not science. The other side says it's good science. Actually, it's bad science.
The theory is a testable hypothesis. There would be evidence for the theory if all the facts about biology were in and there were origins of life forms that were inexplicable other than by appealing to a supernatural designer. Everything has a cause. If we were to gather all of the facts in biology labs and, sifting through these facts, find that they are unable to account for the origins of life forms, we would be warranted in appealing to supernatural causes.
However, ID of today is, to put it mildly, premature. Biologists haven't gathered all of the facts yet. To assert at this time that there are mysteries, irreducible complexities, or what have you shows considerable doxastic incontinence. When you jump the gun, you get refuted the next year by other biologists. For example, Behe's theory that evolution can't explain certain complex arrangements in nature involved his assuming that evolution couldn't explain how a complex arrangement could arrise by evolution when it could not exist without any one of its components. But other biologists demonstrated that he shouldn't have been so credulous.
People like Behe should put their manuscripts aside and wait a couple hundred years. Maybe by then biology will be finished and leave an impossible remainder of mysteries requiring supernatural explanation. Given that it's got just about everything sewn up at this point, I wouldn't bet on evolutionary theory failing to finish the story complete. But who knows? It's possible. Some people, like Art Bell or whoever, think the planet was seeded by a dying race of Martians. God, Martians, ordinary evolution? We'll see. So far no sign of God or Martians yet.
One side says it's not science. The other side says it's good science. Actually, it's bad science.
The theory is a testable hypothesis. There would be evidence for the theory if all the facts about biology were in and there were origins of life forms that were inexplicable other than by appealing to a supernatural designer. Everything has a cause. If we were to gather all of the facts in biology labs and, sifting through these facts, find that they are unable to account for the origins of life forms, we would be warranted in appealing to supernatural causes.
However, ID of today is, to put it mildly, premature. Biologists haven't gathered all of the facts yet. To assert at this time that there are mysteries, irreducible complexities, or what have you shows considerable doxastic incontinence. When you jump the gun, you get refuted the next year by other biologists. For example, Behe's theory that evolution can't explain certain complex arrangements in nature involved his assuming that evolution couldn't explain how a complex arrangement could arrise by evolution when it could not exist without any one of its components. But other biologists demonstrated that he shouldn't have been so credulous.
People like Behe should put their manuscripts aside and wait a couple hundred years. Maybe by then biology will be finished and leave an impossible remainder of mysteries requiring supernatural explanation. Given that it's got just about everything sewn up at this point, I wouldn't bet on evolutionary theory failing to finish the story complete. But who knows? It's possible. Some people, like Art Bell or whoever, think the planet was seeded by a dying race of Martians. God, Martians, ordinary evolution? We'll see. So far no sign of God or Martians yet.
Friday, April 04, 2003
Alas
It's a no-go. Several readers suggested I post something once a week, instead of signing off entirely. But it's clear that I'm not going to be able to hack it. I'm up 'til 1am every night with the friggin' Schrodinger equation or some wiggity-wack ketones. I'm pouring myself into chemistry now, and for the next several months, so I can make the career change to 'chemist'. I'm totally exhausted, and I can't even finish my Kekes series. So, I'll have to bid a final goodbye to all my dear readers and thank you all so much for coming along. I'm choosing brute necessity over delight. Without Philosoblog, my life will be worse. But without a smooth career change, disaster looms. I can't tell my two-year-old, "Um, I'm not going to fit that concept of a 'father as provider' anymore." How will I respond when the little tyke says, "Let me get this straight. You quit a well-paying career and now you're serving fries?!" I have nothing to offer our market economy besides a mediocre scientific acumen. (I thought maybe I'd try to make it in pro ball, since I'm only 37. But, nah.) The chemistry jobs are there, but I'll have to hustle. So, fare well, thanks again, and I'll no doubt see you in the blogosphere.
It's a no-go. Several readers suggested I post something once a week, instead of signing off entirely. But it's clear that I'm not going to be able to hack it. I'm up 'til 1am every night with the friggin' Schrodinger equation or some wiggity-wack ketones. I'm pouring myself into chemistry now, and for the next several months, so I can make the career change to 'chemist'. I'm totally exhausted, and I can't even finish my Kekes series. So, I'll have to bid a final goodbye to all my dear readers and thank you all so much for coming along. I'm choosing brute necessity over delight. Without Philosoblog, my life will be worse. But without a smooth career change, disaster looms. I can't tell my two-year-old, "Um, I'm not going to fit that concept of a 'father as provider' anymore." How will I respond when the little tyke says, "Let me get this straight. You quit a well-paying career and now you're serving fries?!" I have nothing to offer our market economy besides a mediocre scientific acumen. (I thought maybe I'd try to make it in pro ball, since I'm only 37. But, nah.) The chemistry jobs are there, but I'll have to hustle. So, fare well, thanks again, and I'll no doubt see you in the blogosphere.
Saturday, March 29, 2003
This and that
Canadian, eh? Check out Curt Gebeshuber's site, and don't miss the initial picture of matrimonial bliss. Makes me want to get married again.
You wanna hear singin'? Go rent the 1997 Peanuts cartoon, "It was my Best Birthday Ever, Charlie Brown." When you hear Linus's new heartthrob sing Puccini's "O mio babbino caro" you will swoon. Great song, great singer. Hey, I take it wherever I can get it.
Canadian, eh? Check out Curt Gebeshuber's site, and don't miss the initial picture of matrimonial bliss. Makes me want to get married again.
You wanna hear singin'? Go rent the 1997 Peanuts cartoon, "It was my Best Birthday Ever, Charlie Brown." When you hear Linus's new heartthrob sing Puccini's "O mio babbino caro" you will swoon. Great song, great singer. Hey, I take it wherever I can get it.
Thursday, March 27, 2003
Warrior
God of the Machine has commented on the excellence of our warriors, and so has Aristotle. Aristotle even said that the courage of the warrior is the quitessential moral virtue. Of course, experienced warriors, pacifists, and others report that war is hell and should not simply be glorified.
Make no mistake; both points of view are right. War is hell. I hope my son becomes a warrior. War is amongst the most awful of things. Facing it and standing fast on the side of right, even during the most intense onslaughts, is at the apex of human attainment. To face hell, in order to protect one's people against undeserved assault, and to have the nerve to fight with excellence, is fine. Those who simply glorify war and deny its horrors, and those who disparage the warrior, are not to be taken seriously. Take for example the leftist twits who say that the manufacture of military weaponry is evil. (Some of these twits are full professors of philosophy at U. of Toronto - check the letters to the editor of this week's Globe and Mail.) There is a reason they are able to say this. It's that they aren't dead. And the reason for that is that the warrior protects them. Sometimes people overlook the horror of war and simply glorify it. But when they are brought up short by the gore, they should avoid inferring that it is inappropriate to venerate our warriors and recognize that what they do is fine, even most fine.
Posting
Thanks, again, to all of you who so kindly asked me to keep blogging. You've reversed the tide. Resolved: to blog on, albeit maybe only a couple posts a week. (If you don't know what I'm talking about because you haven't been here in a while, go here.) I'd like to continue with John Kekes. (One more post on Facing Evil and then it's on to A Case for Conservatism.) This Fall, I'd like to dig into John Adams.
A Steynism
Here's a chuckle for you: a Mark Steynism from about six months ago. Steyn maintained that bin Laden was not alive but was instead somewhere in Afghanistan "pushing up daisy cutter bits." I giggle over that one once a week or so.
God of the Machine has commented on the excellence of our warriors, and so has Aristotle. Aristotle even said that the courage of the warrior is the quitessential moral virtue. Of course, experienced warriors, pacifists, and others report that war is hell and should not simply be glorified.
Make no mistake; both points of view are right. War is hell. I hope my son becomes a warrior. War is amongst the most awful of things. Facing it and standing fast on the side of right, even during the most intense onslaughts, is at the apex of human attainment. To face hell, in order to protect one's people against undeserved assault, and to have the nerve to fight with excellence, is fine. Those who simply glorify war and deny its horrors, and those who disparage the warrior, are not to be taken seriously. Take for example the leftist twits who say that the manufacture of military weaponry is evil. (Some of these twits are full professors of philosophy at U. of Toronto - check the letters to the editor of this week's Globe and Mail.) There is a reason they are able to say this. It's that they aren't dead. And the reason for that is that the warrior protects them. Sometimes people overlook the horror of war and simply glorify it. But when they are brought up short by the gore, they should avoid inferring that it is inappropriate to venerate our warriors and recognize that what they do is fine, even most fine.
Posting
Thanks, again, to all of you who so kindly asked me to keep blogging. You've reversed the tide. Resolved: to blog on, albeit maybe only a couple posts a week. (If you don't know what I'm talking about because you haven't been here in a while, go here.) I'd like to continue with John Kekes. (One more post on Facing Evil and then it's on to A Case for Conservatism.) This Fall, I'd like to dig into John Adams.
A Steynism
Here's a chuckle for you: a Mark Steynism from about six months ago. Steyn maintained that bin Laden was not alive but was instead somewhere in Afghanistan "pushing up daisy cutter bits." I giggle over that one once a week or so.
Tuesday, March 25, 2003
Permissible and Obligatory
These are two categories of right action. Obligatory actions are a kind of permissible action. (If an action is obligatory, you can bet it's permissible.) The invasion is permissible for the allies to undertake, since it reduces the physical insecurity of those innocents affects; an action can't be wrong if it only helps innocents. I don't think the invasion is obligatory. We sacrifice too many of our men in undertaking it. This sacrifice outweighs the good it does for innocents. The reason is that the number of innocents under threat must be very, very high to make it obligatory for us to risk around 1,000 of our soldiers to help them. How high, I don't know, but you get the idea: much, much higher than 1,000. Millions. In other words, the invasion is a moral option. We may invade, or not. Whether it is prudentially rational for us to invade (as I think it is) is not relevant to the moral question of permissibility. It may be imprudent, even foolish not to invade and still permissible. (On the other hand, it may be obligatory for our government to invade if the government has a duty to protect us. But leave that aside. Consider the U.S. as a single person.)
The shame of Canada, then, is not that it fails its duty to aid Iraqi innocents. It's shame is that it argued against, and rejected, the permissibility of the invasion; it thus impeded the mission psychologically and distorted moral facts. It's shame is that it does nothing to support the invasion, in the way of moral, logistical or financial support. It's shame is that it is a security freeloader. It won't fight, but it will enjoy the security of reduction of terrorism. And as Aristotle would have put it, Canada's shame is that the invasion is an example of fine action; Canada backs down, in cowardice, hatred and envy, from an opportunity to engage in fine action with its friends. Canada has a duty to help the invasion in some way. Chretien was upbraided today in Parliament by a right-wing Alliance party member. He immediately justified his withholding support for the invasion on the following grounds: that Canada is a sovereign state that acts independently. This non sequitur is always the first reason Canadians give for maintaining their broken socialized health care system: difference from the U.S. This is shameful. Oddly, Canada had a duty to help the invasion where the U.S. perhaps did not have a duty to undertake it.
(Notice I don't speak of the shame of the French and Germans. They are shameless, and there is no point speaking about shame in their connection. They are morally dysfunctional societies.)
Some kinds of permissible action are supererogatory: beyond the call of duty: for the sake of others and requiring concession of one's own interests. The invasion of Iraq is not supererogatory, since it is in the U.S.'s interest to take out the Saddam regime. But since the invasion is not obligatory, the fact that similarly distressed peoples go without U.S. rescue is not an indication of U.S. hypocrisy. The U.S. has a right not to exercise its option to take out other murderous regimes. That it decides to exercise the option in the case of Iraq is therefore no grounds for the prevalent charge of hypocrisy heard today on the left. On the contrary, the fact that the U.S. clearly takes the rescue of Iraqis as one reason for invasion implies that it ought to be thanked by the rescued people, as I'm sure it already is and will be. One thanks a fireman who risks his life for one, even if he has additional, self-interested reasons for saving one.
These are two categories of right action. Obligatory actions are a kind of permissible action. (If an action is obligatory, you can bet it's permissible.) The invasion is permissible for the allies to undertake, since it reduces the physical insecurity of those innocents affects; an action can't be wrong if it only helps innocents. I don't think the invasion is obligatory. We sacrifice too many of our men in undertaking it. This sacrifice outweighs the good it does for innocents. The reason is that the number of innocents under threat must be very, very high to make it obligatory for us to risk around 1,000 of our soldiers to help them. How high, I don't know, but you get the idea: much, much higher than 1,000. Millions. In other words, the invasion is a moral option. We may invade, or not. Whether it is prudentially rational for us to invade (as I think it is) is not relevant to the moral question of permissibility. It may be imprudent, even foolish not to invade and still permissible. (On the other hand, it may be obligatory for our government to invade if the government has a duty to protect us. But leave that aside. Consider the U.S. as a single person.)
The shame of Canada, then, is not that it fails its duty to aid Iraqi innocents. It's shame is that it argued against, and rejected, the permissibility of the invasion; it thus impeded the mission psychologically and distorted moral facts. It's shame is that it does nothing to support the invasion, in the way of moral, logistical or financial support. It's shame is that it is a security freeloader. It won't fight, but it will enjoy the security of reduction of terrorism. And as Aristotle would have put it, Canada's shame is that the invasion is an example of fine action; Canada backs down, in cowardice, hatred and envy, from an opportunity to engage in fine action with its friends. Canada has a duty to help the invasion in some way. Chretien was upbraided today in Parliament by a right-wing Alliance party member. He immediately justified his withholding support for the invasion on the following grounds: that Canada is a sovereign state that acts independently. This non sequitur is always the first reason Canadians give for maintaining their broken socialized health care system: difference from the U.S. This is shameful. Oddly, Canada had a duty to help the invasion where the U.S. perhaps did not have a duty to undertake it.
(Notice I don't speak of the shame of the French and Germans. They are shameless, and there is no point speaking about shame in their connection. They are morally dysfunctional societies.)
Some kinds of permissible action are supererogatory: beyond the call of duty: for the sake of others and requiring concession of one's own interests. The invasion of Iraq is not supererogatory, since it is in the U.S.'s interest to take out the Saddam regime. But since the invasion is not obligatory, the fact that similarly distressed peoples go without U.S. rescue is not an indication of U.S. hypocrisy. The U.S. has a right not to exercise its option to take out other murderous regimes. That it decides to exercise the option in the case of Iraq is therefore no grounds for the prevalent charge of hypocrisy heard today on the left. On the contrary, the fact that the U.S. clearly takes the rescue of Iraqis as one reason for invasion implies that it ought to be thanked by the rescued people, as I'm sure it already is and will be. One thanks a fireman who risks his life for one, even if he has additional, self-interested reasons for saving one.
Ugh
Like I say, I think Philosoblog has only a couple weeks left, because I'm far behind on sleep, have to change careers, learn chemistry, move 600 miles, etc., all in the next couple months. So, I should quit blogging.
But, then, deep in my Gemini heart I know that's a lie. Geminis are driven to do many things at once.
No it isn't a lie. I guess. Anyway, thanks to those who've so kindly expressed regret that I'll be signing off.
Like I say, I think Philosoblog has only a couple weeks left, because I'm far behind on sleep, have to change careers, learn chemistry, move 600 miles, etc., all in the next couple months. So, I should quit blogging.
But, then, deep in my Gemini heart I know that's a lie. Geminis are driven to do many things at once.
No it isn't a lie. I guess. Anyway, thanks to those who've so kindly expressed regret that I'll be signing off.
Monday, March 24, 2003
Stalinism
The anti-war crowd exhibits a Stalinism: a disposition to psychopathic callousness to the suffering of innocents whenever compassion would hamper the leftist agenda. I just asked a lefty colleague about the Iraqis who are happy to be liberated. He denied these reports and shrugged the idea off. I repeat:
Knocking out Saddam's regime makes innocent people in the region safer, even taking into account the short-term dangers of the invasion. This is because the regime will kill many more, if it is allowed to continue into the indefinite future, than will be killed by the invasion. (Gulf War 1991 civilian deaths: less than 3,000; Saddam kills 3,500 per month.) There is therefore no grounds to protest the invasion. There isn't even a remotely plausible case that it is wrong. The anti-war protesters are motivated by dogma, hatred, envy and stupidity. (We may psychologize when our opponent in dispute lacks any plausible argument whatsoever. He must hold his position for reasons other than argument: psychological reasons.)
Objections:
"But the U.S. doesn't take out many other evil regimes in the world." This is a red herring. It is permissible to destroy those regimes, too. At best you could say that the U.S. is remiss in not doing so. But this wouldn't have the slightest tendency to show that it shouldn't knock out the Iraqi regime.
"But the U.S. has self-interested motives: to dissarm Saddam/steal oil/take over the world." Red herring. The rightness of an action is independent of its motives.
"Ah, but, you see, the U.S. does intend to take over the world, and taking over Iraq is a step in that direction." Like Afghanistan and Bosnia, I guess. This is tin-foil hat stuff. This is genuine delusional mental illness caused by hatred.
"But it's against international law." False, but even if true, irrelevant. If an action would otherwise be morally permissible, the fact that it is illegal hasn't even the slightest tendency to override and show that it is wrong. And in this case, international law is a joke because there is no international government. "But it's illegal" is a moral reason only when the action in question would contribute to anarchy. But there already is anarchy in the international sphere.
"But then any country will be able to invade any other country, now that they know UN approval isn't necessary." This is loopy. Is there any evidence that the U.S.'s disposition to punish aggressors will encourage aggressors? Even very, very stupid aggressors, who say, "Well, the U.S. gets to invade people, so we do, too."? The idea that bad regimes will be encouraged to invade decent countries is bizarre and there is not the slightest bit of evidence for it. Moreover, if the U.S.'s actions encourage decent countries to take out evil regimes, then that's good, not bad.
The anti-war crowd exhibits a Stalinism: a disposition to psychopathic callousness to the suffering of innocents whenever compassion would hamper the leftist agenda. I just asked a lefty colleague about the Iraqis who are happy to be liberated. He denied these reports and shrugged the idea off. I repeat:
Knocking out Saddam's regime makes innocent people in the region safer, even taking into account the short-term dangers of the invasion. This is because the regime will kill many more, if it is allowed to continue into the indefinite future, than will be killed by the invasion. (Gulf War 1991 civilian deaths: less than 3,000; Saddam kills 3,500 per month.) There is therefore no grounds to protest the invasion. There isn't even a remotely plausible case that it is wrong. The anti-war protesters are motivated by dogma, hatred, envy and stupidity. (We may psychologize when our opponent in dispute lacks any plausible argument whatsoever. He must hold his position for reasons other than argument: psychological reasons.)
Objections:
"But the U.S. doesn't take out many other evil regimes in the world." This is a red herring. It is permissible to destroy those regimes, too. At best you could say that the U.S. is remiss in not doing so. But this wouldn't have the slightest tendency to show that it shouldn't knock out the Iraqi regime.
"But the U.S. has self-interested motives: to dissarm Saddam/steal oil/take over the world." Red herring. The rightness of an action is independent of its motives.
"Ah, but, you see, the U.S. does intend to take over the world, and taking over Iraq is a step in that direction." Like Afghanistan and Bosnia, I guess. This is tin-foil hat stuff. This is genuine delusional mental illness caused by hatred.
"But it's against international law." False, but even if true, irrelevant. If an action would otherwise be morally permissible, the fact that it is illegal hasn't even the slightest tendency to override and show that it is wrong. And in this case, international law is a joke because there is no international government. "But it's illegal" is a moral reason only when the action in question would contribute to anarchy. But there already is anarchy in the international sphere.
"But then any country will be able to invade any other country, now that they know UN approval isn't necessary." This is loopy. Is there any evidence that the U.S.'s disposition to punish aggressors will encourage aggressors? Even very, very stupid aggressors, who say, "Well, the U.S. gets to invade people, so we do, too."? The idea that bad regimes will be encouraged to invade decent countries is bizarre and there is not the slightest bit of evidence for it. Moreover, if the U.S.'s actions encourage decent countries to take out evil regimes, then that's good, not bad.
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