Memorial Day
President Lincoln said it already:
It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us -- that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion -- that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain -- that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom -- and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.
Wednesday, May 21, 2008
The Fascist Switch
Let's take a look at two gestalts through which one sees poltics. One is the Designer. The Designer is the one who looks at political life from the design perspective and decides how to redesign it as he sees fit. To get there one moves, like the circle in Flatland, out of the plane in which people lie and takes a vantage above. An adolescent perspective, it becomes a totalitarian tendency if it persists into adulthood. If a cult of personality is involved, or a General Will, then it is also the fascistic species of totalitarianism.
The other gestalt is the Individual. This is the gestalt in the plane of human life and with no design vantage. Here one sees only a sea of individuals surrounding one, and one doesn't conjure up an elevated design platform upon which to play master of puppets. This is the libertarian perspective.
The Designer, the fascist, is of leftist economical philosophy. As human nature is given free rein to flourish, economic inequalities develop amongst individuals. The Designer necessarily opposes these inequalities and supports egalitarianism because he wants to change the way the world is and inequality is the way the world is. Therefore, given the nature of freedom and humanity, fascism is essentially leftist.
Inside us, there is a switch between the Designer and the Individual. If you turn off the switch, you come to see only an aggregate of individuals with no General Will. It becomes clear that the Designer is a narcissist and an oppressor with no regard for the right of the individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The importance of protecting the individual from Designers and preventing the rise of statism becomes obvious. This realization causes the switch from liberalism at 20 to conservatism at 40.
The connection between fascism and leftism (or "liberalism") now seems to be fourfold:
Let's take a look at two gestalts through which one sees poltics. One is the Designer. The Designer is the one who looks at political life from the design perspective and decides how to redesign it as he sees fit. To get there one moves, like the circle in Flatland, out of the plane in which people lie and takes a vantage above. An adolescent perspective, it becomes a totalitarian tendency if it persists into adulthood. If a cult of personality is involved, or a General Will, then it is also the fascistic species of totalitarianism.
The other gestalt is the Individual. This is the gestalt in the plane of human life and with no design vantage. Here one sees only a sea of individuals surrounding one, and one doesn't conjure up an elevated design platform upon which to play master of puppets. This is the libertarian perspective.
The Designer, the fascist, is of leftist economical philosophy. As human nature is given free rein to flourish, economic inequalities develop amongst individuals. The Designer necessarily opposes these inequalities and supports egalitarianism because he wants to change the way the world is and inequality is the way the world is. Therefore, given the nature of freedom and humanity, fascism is essentially leftist.
Inside us, there is a switch between the Designer and the Individual. If you turn off the switch, you come to see only an aggregate of individuals with no General Will. It becomes clear that the Designer is a narcissist and an oppressor with no regard for the right of the individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The importance of protecting the individual from Designers and preventing the rise of statism becomes obvious. This realization causes the switch from liberalism at 20 to conservatism at 40.
The connection between fascism and leftism (or "liberalism") now seems to be fourfold:
- The philosophical connection that fascism must oppose economic liberty.
- The inherently totalitarian intent of leftism, its sharing the vantage of Designer with fascism.
- Philosophical and psychological nihilism shared by leftism and fascism. This is the belief that, other than envy, nausea and self-loathing (if those can count as values) no values normally upheld by people are inherently real. Hence the Designer's intent to undertake the exciting political design project of replacing these fake values with the new ones of General Will unity and egalitarianism.
- The historical connections explained by Jonah Goldberg in Liberal Fascism.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Whether to Vote for McCain or Obama
Reasons to vote for McCain:
As for the GOP, I'm through with it. It needs to expire as badly as the Democratic Party does. Both are useless.
Reasons to vote for McCain:
- He will be a decent CIC and we are at war.
- He has a chance of appointing good Supreme Court justices.
- McCain has no other redeeming qualities. He has poor judgment. His support of the Kyoto Protocol is an example. There are many other examples.
- The country should move as quickly as possible towards totalitarianism if that is the direction in which it is moving. And that is indeed the direction. (Not that the U.S. will be a fully totalitarian state but that it is moving along the scale in that direction.) A slower movement will dig itself deeper roots and go unnoticed longer, therefore being more difficult to reverse. A quicker move toward totalitarianism will throw the results into starker relief, thereby causing a reactive pulling back toward liberty before totalitarian roots grow too deep.
As for the GOP, I'm through with it. It needs to expire as badly as the Democratic Party does. Both are useless.
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Iraq War: Five Years On
The war is going well enough: as well as can be reasonably tolerated, expected and predicted: middling well.
Here's why. We have Iraq on a trajectory that one may reasonably hope to end in a decent society. We have Iran much closer to being surrounded by our allies. We have al Qaeda quite hurt by the course of the War on Terror without our having to fight in the U.S. Also, War on Terror casualties are low compared to other U.S. wars. The possibility of Iraq using its WMD programs to terrible ends has been eliminated. The criminal Oil for Food starvation racket is gone and Iraq won't experience thirty more years of Hussein oppression.
In Iraq the American military is having one of its finest hours.
Strategic mistakes were, as the saying goes, made. Some were excusable, some not. All were normal to war.
Bottom line: five years on the Iraq War was the right decision. As I said at the time, there is no doubt that it was morally permissible. At this juncture it also seems to have been prudent for the reasons listed above. Liberate them or they will destroy us. The War on Terror will be a long one. I think my sons, now small, will likely fight in it.
If this evaluation sounds polyannish to you, as if I've overlooked the horror of the war, then perhaps you share John Stewart's assumption that The Authorities have a duty to remind you that war is a nasty business. In that case it is you who have overlooked the horror, not I.
The war is going well enough: as well as can be reasonably tolerated, expected and predicted: middling well.
Here's why. We have Iraq on a trajectory that one may reasonably hope to end in a decent society. We have Iran much closer to being surrounded by our allies. We have al Qaeda quite hurt by the course of the War on Terror without our having to fight in the U.S. Also, War on Terror casualties are low compared to other U.S. wars. The possibility of Iraq using its WMD programs to terrible ends has been eliminated. The criminal Oil for Food starvation racket is gone and Iraq won't experience thirty more years of Hussein oppression.
In Iraq the American military is having one of its finest hours.
Strategic mistakes were, as the saying goes, made. Some were excusable, some not. All were normal to war.
Bottom line: five years on the Iraq War was the right decision. As I said at the time, there is no doubt that it was morally permissible. At this juncture it also seems to have been prudent for the reasons listed above. Liberate them or they will destroy us. The War on Terror will be a long one. I think my sons, now small, will likely fight in it.
If this evaluation sounds polyannish to you, as if I've overlooked the horror of the war, then perhaps you share John Stewart's assumption that The Authorities have a duty to remind you that war is a nasty business. In that case it is you who have overlooked the horror, not I.
Douglas Feith on The John Stewart Show
I saw this show for the first time last night. It was an uplifting experience. Stewart, for all his political dysfunction - his focus on how he and other anti-Iraq War partisans felt in the run-up to the war about how prudent the option to invade Iraq was, and his unreflective and shamefully childish assumption that the government had a duty at that time to remind Americans that war is risky - was not unhinged by his anger and resentment. Right there on an anti-Iraq War TV show, the reality of the basic anti-Iraq War tenet that the Bush administration lied its way into the Iraq War was brilliantly illuminated and shown to have no basis in reality. Stewart didn't fly off the handle; he could only sit there gazing upon the facts.
Stewart could not protest because he is a reasonable man in spite of his dysfunction. He did not fly into spasms of rage when listening to Feith. It was an example of a non-dysfunctional confrontation of the anti-Iraq War side with what the Bush administration actually did in making its decision to invade Iraq. It is a shame that all anti-Bush demagogues aren't as well-equipped with a deeper core of sanity and temperament as Stewart is, succumbing instead to irrational resentment and hatred.
(I didn't see the entire 20-minute interview available on the Web, but only the edited-for-TV version.)
I saw this show for the first time last night. It was an uplifting experience. Stewart, for all his political dysfunction - his focus on how he and other anti-Iraq War partisans felt in the run-up to the war about how prudent the option to invade Iraq was, and his unreflective and shamefully childish assumption that the government had a duty at that time to remind Americans that war is risky - was not unhinged by his anger and resentment. Right there on an anti-Iraq War TV show, the reality of the basic anti-Iraq War tenet that the Bush administration lied its way into the Iraq War was brilliantly illuminated and shown to have no basis in reality. Stewart didn't fly off the handle; he could only sit there gazing upon the facts.
Stewart could not protest because he is a reasonable man in spite of his dysfunction. He did not fly into spasms of rage when listening to Feith. It was an example of a non-dysfunctional confrontation of the anti-Iraq War side with what the Bush administration actually did in making its decision to invade Iraq. It is a shame that all anti-Bush demagogues aren't as well-equipped with a deeper core of sanity and temperament as Stewart is, succumbing instead to irrational resentment and hatred.
(I didn't see the entire 20-minute interview available on the Web, but only the edited-for-TV version.)
Sunday, May 11, 2008
Good Pop
Here's your good pop for the month:
The Beach Boys. Dear God, Thanks for letting Brian compose this for us.
Journey. Dear Journey, I'm sorry I hated you because the cool kids told me to.
The Shins. (Minimize screen. Do not watch the video. It's so bad you won't be able to hear the song.)
Don't like pop? Here's Raw Power.
Here's your good pop for the month:
The Beach Boys. Dear God, Thanks for letting Brian compose this for us.
Journey. Dear Journey, I'm sorry I hated you because the cool kids told me to.
The Shins. (Minimize screen. Do not watch the video. It's so bad you won't be able to hear the song.)
Don't like pop? Here's Raw Power.
The White Vote
You're being hoodwinked by The Man again.
Sometimes The Man is the talking head who tells you Obama is having a tough time getting the non-college-educated white vote. Because those whites are racist, of course. Got that? For 20 years Obama attends (and now continues to attend) a church ridden with the social disease but whites who find this objectionable are the racists. Do you have that straight? Whites who won't vote for guy who prefers the racist milieu are racists. Go ahead and believe it if you don't have the guts to stare down The Man with the race-baiting eyes. You're being lied to in order to coax you into voting for an unqualified candidate. The lie is that the racist is not a racist, and those who object to racism are racists. The Man is trying to cripple your mind with guilt. If you don't have a spine, you will let him do it. It's your choice, not his.
In fact Obama has no difficulty in getting the white vote. He has difficulty in getting the vote of people who do not have the social disease of racism. College-educated people and blacks suffer from the disease at much higher rates than anyone else, so they're voting for Obama because he's black and because they do not mind his preference for a racist church. There is no evidence that non-college-educated white voters won't vote for a black. They simply prefer a candidate who has a record of achievement, who doesn't demonstrate poor judgment about abiding in a racist milieu, and who won't lie when asked whether he knew that he had embraced a racist minister for 20 years.
In your mind, juxtapose the facts with the hypnotic force. If you just keep the facts in view and calmly watch your inclination to relent to The Man's mesmeric influence on your disposition to feel guilt, then the inclination will subside. You will see The Man for the demon that he is.
The Man may also be found in Alan Abramowitz. He says you're a racist if you believe "that African American poverty and other problems are largely the result of lack of ambition and effort, rather than white racism and discrimination." He implies that you won't vote for Obama because you have this belief and because Obama prefers a milieu that is beside itself with rage in rejecting this belief. Go ahead, accept what The Man is saying. The problem isn't black communities dysfunctional culture. After all, a black kid can't study hard, graduate from high school, leave the milieu of this dysfunctional culture, find employment, and have a good life. Right? Sure. You can believe that. Anyway, believing it is easier than staring down The Man with the mesmeric eyes. It's easy to slip into his control - as easy as slipping into sleep.
The Man hates it when black kids leave their dysfunctional culture and succeed. The demon in him howls whenever these kids go on as adults to wax proud of themselves for it. He hates everyone to be treated as an individual. He lusts for control over people grouped by this or that identifier, as long as the identifier isn't content of their individual and unique characters. He will never stop trying to trick all into submitting to his power when in fact he has control over no one who doesn't choose to submit.
You have a good heart. You feel horrific shame at the thought of discovering that you are a racist. You are kind and trusting. Unfortunately, there is a wolf who would prey upon you because you have such a heart. You need to be able to stare into the wolf's face calmly, strongly and without anger. When you do this you will find that he has no power over you.
You're being hoodwinked by The Man again.
Sometimes The Man is the talking head who tells you Obama is having a tough time getting the non-college-educated white vote. Because those whites are racist, of course. Got that? For 20 years Obama attends (and now continues to attend) a church ridden with the social disease but whites who find this objectionable are the racists. Do you have that straight? Whites who won't vote for guy who prefers the racist milieu are racists. Go ahead and believe it if you don't have the guts to stare down The Man with the race-baiting eyes. You're being lied to in order to coax you into voting for an unqualified candidate. The lie is that the racist is not a racist, and those who object to racism are racists. The Man is trying to cripple your mind with guilt. If you don't have a spine, you will let him do it. It's your choice, not his.
In fact Obama has no difficulty in getting the white vote. He has difficulty in getting the vote of people who do not have the social disease of racism. College-educated people and blacks suffer from the disease at much higher rates than anyone else, so they're voting for Obama because he's black and because they do not mind his preference for a racist church. There is no evidence that non-college-educated white voters won't vote for a black. They simply prefer a candidate who has a record of achievement, who doesn't demonstrate poor judgment about abiding in a racist milieu, and who won't lie when asked whether he knew that he had embraced a racist minister for 20 years.
In your mind, juxtapose the facts with the hypnotic force. If you just keep the facts in view and calmly watch your inclination to relent to The Man's mesmeric influence on your disposition to feel guilt, then the inclination will subside. You will see The Man for the demon that he is.
The Man may also be found in Alan Abramowitz. He says you're a racist if you believe "that African American poverty and other problems are largely the result of lack of ambition and effort, rather than white racism and discrimination." He implies that you won't vote for Obama because you have this belief and because Obama prefers a milieu that is beside itself with rage in rejecting this belief. Go ahead, accept what The Man is saying. The problem isn't black communities dysfunctional culture. After all, a black kid can't study hard, graduate from high school, leave the milieu of this dysfunctional culture, find employment, and have a good life. Right? Sure. You can believe that. Anyway, believing it is easier than staring down The Man with the mesmeric eyes. It's easy to slip into his control - as easy as slipping into sleep.
The Man hates it when black kids leave their dysfunctional culture and succeed. The demon in him howls whenever these kids go on as adults to wax proud of themselves for it. He hates everyone to be treated as an individual. He lusts for control over people grouped by this or that identifier, as long as the identifier isn't content of their individual and unique characters. He will never stop trying to trick all into submitting to his power when in fact he has control over no one who doesn't choose to submit.
You have a good heart. You feel horrific shame at the thought of discovering that you are a racist. You are kind and trusting. Unfortunately, there is a wolf who would prey upon you because you have such a heart. You need to be able to stare into the wolf's face calmly, strongly and without anger. When you do this you will find that he has no power over you.
Friday, May 02, 2008
Conquering Death
The inevitability of death is not so much a philosophical problem as a neural problem. Of course, death is undesirable because existing is desirable. Philosophy can explain that life is worth living in spite of the inevitability of the end, but this does little to mitigate the undesirability of the end. When you look under the hood, the undesirability turns out to be little subject to philosophy, anyway. What's under the hood is terror. Death is a neural problem.
Conquering death requires addressing the neural problem. Life is dear and we can be mesmerized by it. Even if one has the capacity to accept and to value the finite life one is given to live, one may still have anguish at the coming of the night because life compels a clinging in the nerves, a terror. Dread of death is driven by this hypnotic state, not by reasoning.
There are meditative techniques for dissolving the shackles that affix one to mesmeric objects. A key player in all this is the gut. I venture this: The solar plexus is a neural center about which a tight musculature makes placid confidence impossible. There is a certain fortitude to be obtained that allows the local muscles to relax. It is a deep strength that lets the belly sit loosely. One's neural state has a certain flow, free of frenetic tangles that generate terror when the threat to the beloved (life) is contemplated. There is neither clenching and bracing for the end nor forlorn resignation. There is only placidity and great strength.
A samurai once threated a man, saying, "Did you know that I could cut you in half without blinking an eye?" The man replied, "Did you know that I could be cut in half by you without blinking an eye?" That's a bit campy, but it carries the drift. There are deep reservoirs of strength that enable one to stare death in the face as it happens and accept it nobly yet without anguish. The reservoirs may be tapped by meditative techniques, and perhaps other techniques, as well.
The inevitability of death is not so much a philosophical problem as a neural problem. Of course, death is undesirable because existing is desirable. Philosophy can explain that life is worth living in spite of the inevitability of the end, but this does little to mitigate the undesirability of the end. When you look under the hood, the undesirability turns out to be little subject to philosophy, anyway. What's under the hood is terror. Death is a neural problem.
Conquering death requires addressing the neural problem. Life is dear and we can be mesmerized by it. Even if one has the capacity to accept and to value the finite life one is given to live, one may still have anguish at the coming of the night because life compels a clinging in the nerves, a terror. Dread of death is driven by this hypnotic state, not by reasoning.
There are meditative techniques for dissolving the shackles that affix one to mesmeric objects. A key player in all this is the gut. I venture this: The solar plexus is a neural center about which a tight musculature makes placid confidence impossible. There is a certain fortitude to be obtained that allows the local muscles to relax. It is a deep strength that lets the belly sit loosely. One's neural state has a certain flow, free of frenetic tangles that generate terror when the threat to the beloved (life) is contemplated. There is neither clenching and bracing for the end nor forlorn resignation. There is only placidity and great strength.
A samurai once threated a man, saying, "Did you know that I could cut you in half without blinking an eye?" The man replied, "Did you know that I could be cut in half by you without blinking an eye?" That's a bit campy, but it carries the drift. There are deep reservoirs of strength that enable one to stare death in the face as it happens and accept it nobly yet without anguish. The reservoirs may be tapped by meditative techniques, and perhaps other techniques, as well.
Thursday, April 24, 2008
Willie Horton and Reverend Wright-Type Ads
These are ads that show despicable people who are black in an association, of one kind or another, with a candidate for office. The premise of the day is that these ads are racist. This premise rests upon the further premise that:
Showing such black people on TV, and linking them to a candidate, is racist.
But what is the basis for that premise? There are only two possibilities:
Either:
1. Blacks are a lowly race and linking them to the candidate wrongfully taints him by association to a lowly race.
Or:
2. The ad creator knows that many viewers of the ad incorrectly believe that blacks are a lowly race and will therefore decide not to vote for the candidate associated with blacks in the ad.
Now, #1 is a racist premise. So, anyone who objects to the Horton/Wright-type ads on its grounds is a racist. It shouldn't come as a surprise if many liberals fall under this category. So many of them practice the bigotry of low expectations (excusing Obama's attending a socially diseased church, for example, or refusing to accept that black people can make it on their own in this world, for another example.)
So, the non-racist alternative seems to be #2. But it rests upon a problematic premise. It assumes that it is the intent of the ad creator to influence racist viewers and not to influence viewers who prefer not to vote for candidates associated with despicable people. In fact, as the ads show despicable people linked to a candidate, it is simpler to assume that the ad creator wants to target viewers who don't want to vote for candidates who are linked to despicable people. To prove that the ad creator has the racist viewer in mind carries quite a burden when it's a matter of common sense that very many viewers will not like to vote for candidates who associate with despicable people. This is because not liking to vote for such candidates is itself a common-sense attitude. So, to assume that the target of Horton/Wright-type ads is people with common sense makes more sense than to assume that the target is racists.
In fact, it's a bit loopy to take #2 as the premise for viewing the Horton/Wright-type ads as racist. For this implies that if an ad creator is to escape the sin of racism, he may show only despicable white people, but no despicable black people, in any ad intended to denigrate a candidate by associating him with those people. This implies that any candidate who adores certain despicable people may not be criticized for it in any ad which shows the color of those people's skin if it is black skin. That's simply loopy. Think about it. Horton and Wright may not be shown. Because they're black. If they were white it would be okay. That's nutty.
So, if you think the Horton/Wright ads are racist, then either (#1) you are a racist or (#2) you are committed to a rather loopy premise.
UPDATE: A technical aside: #2 portrays the ad creator as a cynical race-baiter and therefore not a racist in the narrow sense of "racist"; #2 does not entail that the ad creator himself believes that blacks are a lowly race. However, there is an extended sense of the term in which the race-baiter is a racist. In that he is willing to stoke the fires of racism, he is a racist in this extended sense.
These are ads that show despicable people who are black in an association, of one kind or another, with a candidate for office. The premise of the day is that these ads are racist. This premise rests upon the further premise that:
Showing such black people on TV, and linking them to a candidate, is racist.
But what is the basis for that premise? There are only two possibilities:
Either:
1. Blacks are a lowly race and linking them to the candidate wrongfully taints him by association to a lowly race.
Or:
2. The ad creator knows that many viewers of the ad incorrectly believe that blacks are a lowly race and will therefore decide not to vote for the candidate associated with blacks in the ad.
Now, #1 is a racist premise. So, anyone who objects to the Horton/Wright-type ads on its grounds is a racist. It shouldn't come as a surprise if many liberals fall under this category. So many of them practice the bigotry of low expectations (excusing Obama's attending a socially diseased church, for example, or refusing to accept that black people can make it on their own in this world, for another example.)
So, the non-racist alternative seems to be #2. But it rests upon a problematic premise. It assumes that it is the intent of the ad creator to influence racist viewers and not to influence viewers who prefer not to vote for candidates associated with despicable people. In fact, as the ads show despicable people linked to a candidate, it is simpler to assume that the ad creator wants to target viewers who don't want to vote for candidates who are linked to despicable people. To prove that the ad creator has the racist viewer in mind carries quite a burden when it's a matter of common sense that very many viewers will not like to vote for candidates who associate with despicable people. This is because not liking to vote for such candidates is itself a common-sense attitude. So, to assume that the target of Horton/Wright-type ads is people with common sense makes more sense than to assume that the target is racists.
In fact, it's a bit loopy to take #2 as the premise for viewing the Horton/Wright-type ads as racist. For this implies that if an ad creator is to escape the sin of racism, he may show only despicable white people, but no despicable black people, in any ad intended to denigrate a candidate by associating him with those people. This implies that any candidate who adores certain despicable people may not be criticized for it in any ad which shows the color of those people's skin if it is black skin. That's simply loopy. Think about it. Horton and Wright may not be shown. Because they're black. If they were white it would be okay. That's nutty.
So, if you think the Horton/Wright ads are racist, then either (#1) you are a racist or (#2) you are committed to a rather loopy premise.
UPDATE: A technical aside: #2 portrays the ad creator as a cynical race-baiter and therefore not a racist in the narrow sense of "racist"; #2 does not entail that the ad creator himself believes that blacks are a lowly race. However, there is an extended sense of the term in which the race-baiter is a racist. In that he is willing to stoke the fires of racism, he is a racist in this extended sense.
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
Billy Budd V: Susan Mendus's "Innocent Before God"
I take Vere's decision straightforwardly. Vere and his jury did the right thing. Billy committed a capital offense. Instead of sparing Billy's life, they protected the ship and England (from mutiny and the French Revolution, respectively.) Billy's sacrifice, like that of other decent young men sacrificed in war, is just. The book is a microcosmic allegory of the great disaster of war.
Still, there is something to be said for Susan Mendus's idea that the captain's particular personal characteristics made a difference. For Mendus, Vere's choice was right because it fit his character and the agreement he had with his employer to act as captain with such a character. I can imagine a captain of great charisma and persuasive power, able to spare Billy's life while dousing the flames of mutiny. This would be the right path for him to take, while Vere's was right for him. Here the relativistic "right for" locution which Mendus uses makes sense. Right depends, in some sense, on the particular characteristics of the agent and his situation. (A further illustration: what it is right for a person who happens upon a car crash with a badly injured victim to do may depend upon the person's characteristics: Is he a doctor? Is he strong enough to carry the victim? Or better able to flag down a passing motorist? Etc.)
Nevertheless, Mendus's analysis of this particularism about Vere ambiguates over theses that are either trivial or false. No non-trivially true thesis is evident in her article. Even the interesting point about a more charismatic captain than Vere was left unmade by Mendus.
The trivial sense of her thesis is that what is right for the captain of the ship to do depends upon the understanding he has with his employers about what he is to do as captain, given his particular, personal characteristics. Of course, contracts matter, even tacit ones. Whether the captain has promised to use his ingenuity to solve problems or to follow the letter of the law, the promise matters and we all knew that. So, this is trivial. Only if you make the point about a charismatic captain does it become a little more interesting.
The false sense of Mendus's thesis is that the right depends entirely on the agent's desires, talents, and contracts. It does not. This is where the "right for" locution leads one into trouble. There are heavy constraints on right action which are not usually defeasible by the agent's particulars. The situation Vere faces is heavily constrained by the duty not to kill an innocent man, the duty not to allow mutiny, and the duty not to allow the French Revolution to spread to England. Without recognizing this Mendus dwells upon a fanciful melding of the right with the good, under the supposedly liberal flag of value pluralism. She thinks it appropriately liberal and soundly in the tradition of Mill and Rawls to allow that the particular values of the agent determine what it is right for him to do. In fact, Mendus's account suffers from a deficit of value pluralism. John Kekes, the best conservative philosopher we have now, is a value pluralist; his is a model which takes heavy constraints on right seriously. Mendus, on the other hand, dwells on personal preference (good), confusing it with right and not taking seriously the variety of heavy constraints on right. Her account founders on a misconstrual of which values to be pluralistic about and on a confusion of good with right. The failure to be serious about embracing a wide variety of values seems to me an essential defect of liberalism. Duties that don't involve transferring power or wealth to the poor or require that we respect as good and right each person's particular inclinations do not play a significant role in liberal moral and political deliberations. Mendus's article is no exception.
In short, the false sense of Mendus's thesis is that it reduces right to an individualistic good. If Vere were a sadist, then on Mendus's view torturing Billy before executing him might be right; her analysis has no means by which to avoid this conclusion. Alternatively, the trivial sense of the thesis is that the agent's characteristics and contracts matter in moral deliberation. There is no non-trivial true alternative sense of Mendus's thesis.
So, Mendus's thesis has only a little to be said in its favor. It stumbles unknowingly over something interesting and true (the case of the charismatic captain.) But it fails in its derivation of right from a liberal conception of good and it ignores important constraints on the right.
I take Vere's decision straightforwardly. Vere and his jury did the right thing. Billy committed a capital offense. Instead of sparing Billy's life, they protected the ship and England (from mutiny and the French Revolution, respectively.) Billy's sacrifice, like that of other decent young men sacrificed in war, is just. The book is a microcosmic allegory of the great disaster of war.
Still, there is something to be said for Susan Mendus's idea that the captain's particular personal characteristics made a difference. For Mendus, Vere's choice was right because it fit his character and the agreement he had with his employer to act as captain with such a character. I can imagine a captain of great charisma and persuasive power, able to spare Billy's life while dousing the flames of mutiny. This would be the right path for him to take, while Vere's was right for him. Here the relativistic "right for" locution which Mendus uses makes sense. Right depends, in some sense, on the particular characteristics of the agent and his situation. (A further illustration: what it is right for a person who happens upon a car crash with a badly injured victim to do may depend upon the person's characteristics: Is he a doctor? Is he strong enough to carry the victim? Or better able to flag down a passing motorist? Etc.)
Nevertheless, Mendus's analysis of this particularism about Vere ambiguates over theses that are either trivial or false. No non-trivially true thesis is evident in her article. Even the interesting point about a more charismatic captain than Vere was left unmade by Mendus.
The trivial sense of her thesis is that what is right for the captain of the ship to do depends upon the understanding he has with his employers about what he is to do as captain, given his particular, personal characteristics. Of course, contracts matter, even tacit ones. Whether the captain has promised to use his ingenuity to solve problems or to follow the letter of the law, the promise matters and we all knew that. So, this is trivial. Only if you make the point about a charismatic captain does it become a little more interesting.
The false sense of Mendus's thesis is that the right depends entirely on the agent's desires, talents, and contracts. It does not. This is where the "right for" locution leads one into trouble. There are heavy constraints on right action which are not usually defeasible by the agent's particulars. The situation Vere faces is heavily constrained by the duty not to kill an innocent man, the duty not to allow mutiny, and the duty not to allow the French Revolution to spread to England. Without recognizing this Mendus dwells upon a fanciful melding of the right with the good, under the supposedly liberal flag of value pluralism. She thinks it appropriately liberal and soundly in the tradition of Mill and Rawls to allow that the particular values of the agent determine what it is right for him to do. In fact, Mendus's account suffers from a deficit of value pluralism. John Kekes, the best conservative philosopher we have now, is a value pluralist; his is a model which takes heavy constraints on right seriously. Mendus, on the other hand, dwells on personal preference (good), confusing it with right and not taking seriously the variety of heavy constraints on right. Her account founders on a misconstrual of which values to be pluralistic about and on a confusion of good with right. The failure to be serious about embracing a wide variety of values seems to me an essential defect of liberalism. Duties that don't involve transferring power or wealth to the poor or require that we respect as good and right each person's particular inclinations do not play a significant role in liberal moral and political deliberations. Mendus's article is no exception.
In short, the false sense of Mendus's thesis is that it reduces right to an individualistic good. If Vere were a sadist, then on Mendus's view torturing Billy before executing him might be right; her analysis has no means by which to avoid this conclusion. Alternatively, the trivial sense of the thesis is that the agent's characteristics and contracts matter in moral deliberation. There is no non-trivial true alternative sense of Mendus's thesis.
So, Mendus's thesis has only a little to be said in its favor. It stumbles unknowingly over something interesting and true (the case of the charismatic captain.) But it fails in its derivation of right from a liberal conception of good and it ignores important constraints on the right.
Sunday, April 20, 2008
Billy Budd IV: The Bully as Hypnotist
The innocent and good are not always prepared for the psychological subterfuge of the bully or psychopath. The proper preparation is an immobility of the emotions, a kind of stillness at a resting point or sweet spot of sorts, from which it is impossible to be driven to rage or inappropriate guilt. Billy Budd is not so prepared. He is stricken by John Claggart's attempt to frame him as a mutineer. Meeting his accuser face-to-face, he is unable to respond appropriately. A typical psychopath or bully, Claggart depends upon his hypnotic powers to subdue his prey.
[Billy] stood like one impaled and gagged.... [Claggart's] first mesmeric glance was one of serpent fascination; the last was as the hungry lurch of the torpedo-fish.
"Speak, man!" said Captain Vere to the transfixed one, struck by his aspect even more than by Claggart's, "Speak! defend yourself." Which appeal caused but a strange dumb gesturing and gurgling in Billy; amazement at such an accusation so suddenly sprung on inexperienced nonage; this, and, it may be, horror of the accuser, serving to bring out his lurking defect and in this instance for the time intensifying it into a convulsed tongue-tie; while the intent head and entire form straining forward in an agony of ineffectual eagerness to obey the injunction to speak and defend himself, gave an expression to the face like that of a condemned Vestal priestess in the moment of being buried alive, and in the first struggle against suffocation.
...Billy's aspect recalled to [Vere] that of a bright young schoolmate of his whom he had once seen struck by much the same startling impotence in the act of eagerly rising in the class to be foremost in response to a testing question put to it by the master. Going close up to the young sailor, and laying a soothing hand on his shoulder, he said, "There is no hurry, my boy. Take your time, take your time." Contrary to the effect intended, these words so fatherly in tone, doubtless touching Billy's heart to the quick, prompted yet more violent efforts at utterance--efforts soon ending for the time in confirming the paralysis, and bringing to his face an expression which was as a crucifixion to behold. The next instant, quick as the flame from a discharged cannon at night, his right arm shot out, and Claggart dropped to the deck.
The blow brings about exactly what Claggart desired: Billy's complete undoing.
The good and innocent need to be prepared to respond to bullies with calmness and decisiveness. The bully depends upon the crippling effect of rage, the shame associated with that effect, and the guilt one feels for feeling rage. No attempt to resist these emotions will work because they are eliminated only through a certain calm strength that cannot be created when attempts to resist them are underway. A better tactic is simply to observe these emotions detachedly and without antipathy to them. They pass and one discovers reserves of strength.
Bullies desire their victims to experience impotent rage and guilty self-loathing. What they dread is that the victims have reserves of calmness and impassivity necessary to defeat them.
This advice may bear some partial similarity to various pacifistic philosophies that counsel non-aggression or non-violence. But it is perfectly compatible with more forward-leaning points of view, according to which bullies and psychopaths are to be aggressively hunted down and subdued and, when it's necessary, crushed with preemptive violence. Indeed, I think pacifists mistakenly infer from the preferability of calmness and impassiveness to false conclusions about the preferability of passivity and non-violence.
The innocent and good are not always prepared for the psychological subterfuge of the bully or psychopath. The proper preparation is an immobility of the emotions, a kind of stillness at a resting point or sweet spot of sorts, from which it is impossible to be driven to rage or inappropriate guilt. Billy Budd is not so prepared. He is stricken by John Claggart's attempt to frame him as a mutineer. Meeting his accuser face-to-face, he is unable to respond appropriately. A typical psychopath or bully, Claggart depends upon his hypnotic powers to subdue his prey.
[Billy] stood like one impaled and gagged.... [Claggart's] first mesmeric glance was one of serpent fascination; the last was as the hungry lurch of the torpedo-fish.
"Speak, man!" said Captain Vere to the transfixed one, struck by his aspect even more than by Claggart's, "Speak! defend yourself." Which appeal caused but a strange dumb gesturing and gurgling in Billy; amazement at such an accusation so suddenly sprung on inexperienced nonage; this, and, it may be, horror of the accuser, serving to bring out his lurking defect and in this instance for the time intensifying it into a convulsed tongue-tie; while the intent head and entire form straining forward in an agony of ineffectual eagerness to obey the injunction to speak and defend himself, gave an expression to the face like that of a condemned Vestal priestess in the moment of being buried alive, and in the first struggle against suffocation.
...Billy's aspect recalled to [Vere] that of a bright young schoolmate of his whom he had once seen struck by much the same startling impotence in the act of eagerly rising in the class to be foremost in response to a testing question put to it by the master. Going close up to the young sailor, and laying a soothing hand on his shoulder, he said, "There is no hurry, my boy. Take your time, take your time." Contrary to the effect intended, these words so fatherly in tone, doubtless touching Billy's heart to the quick, prompted yet more violent efforts at utterance--efforts soon ending for the time in confirming the paralysis, and bringing to his face an expression which was as a crucifixion to behold. The next instant, quick as the flame from a discharged cannon at night, his right arm shot out, and Claggart dropped to the deck.
The blow brings about exactly what Claggart desired: Billy's complete undoing.
The good and innocent need to be prepared to respond to bullies with calmness and decisiveness. The bully depends upon the crippling effect of rage, the shame associated with that effect, and the guilt one feels for feeling rage. No attempt to resist these emotions will work because they are eliminated only through a certain calm strength that cannot be created when attempts to resist them are underway. A better tactic is simply to observe these emotions detachedly and without antipathy to them. They pass and one discovers reserves of strength.
Bullies desire their victims to experience impotent rage and guilty self-loathing. What they dread is that the victims have reserves of calmness and impassivity necessary to defeat them.
This advice may bear some partial similarity to various pacifistic philosophies that counsel non-aggression or non-violence. But it is perfectly compatible with more forward-leaning points of view, according to which bullies and psychopaths are to be aggressively hunted down and subdued and, when it's necessary, crushed with preemptive violence. Indeed, I think pacifists mistakenly infer from the preferability of calmness and impassiveness to false conclusions about the preferability of passivity and non-violence.
Marc Bennett, RIP
I had a friend well worth having two decades ago, during my college days at Swarthmore. Marc Bennett passed away last year, leaving behind a wife, Anna, and young son, Asher.
My memory of Marc has stayed fresh these twenty years. He was at once funny and serious, friendly and, let's just say, prickly. Put it this way, he was a gentleman who didn't shy away from letting me know where there were deficiencies in my character obvious to him though not to me. Heedless as I was, I'm grateful that the memory stuck with me and that I was able to have quite a few laughs with him.
To Asher I say, You may someday be lucky enough to have memories of your father pointing the way for you to be a better man. I'd say don't ignore them as much as I did when I was twenty.
I had a friend well worth having two decades ago, during my college days at Swarthmore. Marc Bennett passed away last year, leaving behind a wife, Anna, and young son, Asher.
My memory of Marc has stayed fresh these twenty years. He was at once funny and serious, friendly and, let's just say, prickly. Put it this way, he was a gentleman who didn't shy away from letting me know where there were deficiencies in my character obvious to him though not to me. Heedless as I was, I'm grateful that the memory stuck with me and that I was able to have quite a few laughs with him.
To Asher I say, You may someday be lucky enough to have memories of your father pointing the way for you to be a better man. I'd say don't ignore them as much as I did when I was twenty.
Sunday, April 13, 2008
Billy Budd III: John Claggart
John Claggart, a psychopath, will frame Billy Budd for mutiny simply because he hates him. Melville applies the label "mystery" to the intelligent psychopath's "antipathy spontaneous and profound," offering only the pseudo-explanation that Claggart has a "natural depravity." Lacking ordinary concern for others' welfare, the psychopath employs reason and a respectable demeanor in order to accomplish evil ends that the rest of us, who do not lack such concern, find uncanny. As Hume might have said, the psychopath prefers the destruction of others to a slight scratch on his finger.
Two further observations suggest themselves. One is that Claggart and Billy likely come from good stock: fine genes. Melville says so. They naturally have the potential for excellence. Claggart's potential has gone to naught, while Billy is a happy and excellent young man.
The form of Billy Budd was heroic; and if his face was without the intellectual look of the pallid Claggart's, not the less was it lit, like his, from within, though from a different source.
Billy is admired, Claggart despised. Claggart resents Billy's happiness; he is utterly consumed by hatred and resentment. He even hates himself for resenting Billy, as his private facial expression becomes distorted with anger when it is publicly proclaimed that he is "down on Billy." Claggart resents his ruined life and present station, he resents Billy, and he resents his resentments. He is not just a psychopath; he has been driven to distraction by resentment.
As I've suggested, unless the novel is just the story of an unusual case of crime and punishment on a boat, Claggart represents war. War is, after all, in part senseless death and mad violence. Much of what occurs in the trenches and in "boarding her in the smoke" is similar to the rage and violence in Claggart's soul. He represents the enemy's ability to deliver this brutality and evil in war. Billy must die when he slays this enemy. If we spare his life, then we end up defenseless against more of the same enemy.
Not only does Billy Budd portray a country's need to sacrifice its fine young men in its own defense; it also shows that the war to which they are sacrificed is a monster who will add a senselessness and indecency to their deaths. What makes sense and is good may be recouped from the senseless and the evil by men of Vere and Budd's caliber. Yet even then, some of them will be psychologically wounded by having to do so, as in Vere's case. We see why; the sensible sacrifice has a senselessness in it. In war, what is good partakes deeply in what is senseless and indecent.
John Claggart, a psychopath, will frame Billy Budd for mutiny simply because he hates him. Melville applies the label "mystery" to the intelligent psychopath's "antipathy spontaneous and profound," offering only the pseudo-explanation that Claggart has a "natural depravity." Lacking ordinary concern for others' welfare, the psychopath employs reason and a respectable demeanor in order to accomplish evil ends that the rest of us, who do not lack such concern, find uncanny. As Hume might have said, the psychopath prefers the destruction of others to a slight scratch on his finger.
Two further observations suggest themselves. One is that Claggart and Billy likely come from good stock: fine genes. Melville says so. They naturally have the potential for excellence. Claggart's potential has gone to naught, while Billy is a happy and excellent young man.
The form of Billy Budd was heroic; and if his face was without the intellectual look of the pallid Claggart's, not the less was it lit, like his, from within, though from a different source.
Billy is admired, Claggart despised. Claggart resents Billy's happiness; he is utterly consumed by hatred and resentment. He even hates himself for resenting Billy, as his private facial expression becomes distorted with anger when it is publicly proclaimed that he is "down on Billy." Claggart resents his ruined life and present station, he resents Billy, and he resents his resentments. He is not just a psychopath; he has been driven to distraction by resentment.
As I've suggested, unless the novel is just the story of an unusual case of crime and punishment on a boat, Claggart represents war. War is, after all, in part senseless death and mad violence. Much of what occurs in the trenches and in "boarding her in the smoke" is similar to the rage and violence in Claggart's soul. He represents the enemy's ability to deliver this brutality and evil in war. Billy must die when he slays this enemy. If we spare his life, then we end up defenseless against more of the same enemy.
Not only does Billy Budd portray a country's need to sacrifice its fine young men in its own defense; it also shows that the war to which they are sacrificed is a monster who will add a senselessness and indecency to their deaths. What makes sense and is good may be recouped from the senseless and the evil by men of Vere and Budd's caliber. Yet even then, some of them will be psychologically wounded by having to do so, as in Vere's case. We see why; the sensible sacrifice has a senselessness in it. In war, what is good partakes deeply in what is senseless and indecent.
Thursday, April 10, 2008
Billy Budd II
In Omoo, Melville writes:
I do not wish to be understood as applauding the flogging system practiced in men-of-war. As long, however, as navies are needed, there is no substitute for it. War being the greatest of evils all its accessories necessarily partake of the same character; and this is about all that can be said in defense of flogging.
Billy sees the results of a brutal flogging and is cowed by it, resolving never to do anything to bring such punishment down upon him. If flogging is justified, then so is the death of a sailor or soldier in battle. Because navies are needed. Because war is unavoidable.
Melville's little tale of criminal justice aboard the Bellipotent is a thumbnail sketch of the justice of sending Billy to war. Billy is a man least deserving of death at war. Yet it is just that he be sent to that fate.
The Dansker says, "Baby Budd, [Claggart] is down on you." Billy: "What for? Why, he calls me 'the sweet and pleasant young fellow,' they tell me." But this is precisely why Claggart intends to send Billy to his death. Rather than being those who we should send to war last, the good are the very ones we need at the front lines. They are the ones who can look death in the face without blinking, as Billy does.
Claggart does not represent just leaders who justly send men to war, of course. He is unsuccessful in his mission to send Billy to his death. The punishment of death comes to Billy for the act of eliminating this enemy out of an instinctive and natural rage and indignance for him, the sort of instinct the young and good, those who we must send to war, should have.
War's evil: Billy and Vere, good men, are accessories to it who necessarily partake of the same character.
In Omoo, Melville writes:
I do not wish to be understood as applauding the flogging system practiced in men-of-war. As long, however, as navies are needed, there is no substitute for it. War being the greatest of evils all its accessories necessarily partake of the same character; and this is about all that can be said in defense of flogging.
Billy sees the results of a brutal flogging and is cowed by it, resolving never to do anything to bring such punishment down upon him. If flogging is justified, then so is the death of a sailor or soldier in battle. Because navies are needed. Because war is unavoidable.
Melville's little tale of criminal justice aboard the Bellipotent is a thumbnail sketch of the justice of sending Billy to war. Billy is a man least deserving of death at war. Yet it is just that he be sent to that fate.
The Dansker says, "Baby Budd, [Claggart] is down on you." Billy: "What for? Why, he calls me 'the sweet and pleasant young fellow,' they tell me." But this is precisely why Claggart intends to send Billy to his death. Rather than being those who we should send to war last, the good are the very ones we need at the front lines. They are the ones who can look death in the face without blinking, as Billy does.
Claggart does not represent just leaders who justly send men to war, of course. He is unsuccessful in his mission to send Billy to his death. The punishment of death comes to Billy for the act of eliminating this enemy out of an instinctive and natural rage and indignance for him, the sort of instinct the young and good, those who we must send to war, should have.
War's evil: Billy and Vere, good men, are accessories to it who necessarily partake of the same character.
Sunday, April 06, 2008
O Mio Babbino Caro
Maria Callas, singing this song so beautifully.
This performance draws tears. But why?
There is a certain nobility of spirit in the girl, a purity of intention to make something good, an admirable self-direction, and a fortitude of will. Tragically, these very virtues will ruin her because she lacks an additional one: wisdom. We are particularly stricken when we see such nobility bring undeserved ruin to itself.
I fret and suffer torments
Oh God, I would rather die
Daddy, have pity, have pity.
In addition, we can vaguely detect that the girl has been someone's victim here. We don't have sympathy for a simply unbalanced character that cooks up some infatuation and then destroys itself. We feel, rather, for the one who has this vulnerability of naivety, a weak spot which is exploited, either by the one she loves or someone else. The girl is a noble victim, too innocent to know how to protect herself from developing an intention to ruin herself.
The music expresses this state of affairs very well, as Callas brings the whole package together. This is why it is especially beautiful and melancholy.
Sissel and Carmen Monarcha also stand out.
Also: Hayley Westenra here and here.
Maria Callas, singing this song so beautifully.
This performance draws tears. But why?
There is a certain nobility of spirit in the girl, a purity of intention to make something good, an admirable self-direction, and a fortitude of will. Tragically, these very virtues will ruin her because she lacks an additional one: wisdom. We are particularly stricken when we see such nobility bring undeserved ruin to itself.
I fret and suffer torments
Oh God, I would rather die
Daddy, have pity, have pity.
In addition, we can vaguely detect that the girl has been someone's victim here. We don't have sympathy for a simply unbalanced character that cooks up some infatuation and then destroys itself. We feel, rather, for the one who has this vulnerability of naivety, a weak spot which is exploited, either by the one she loves or someone else. The girl is a noble victim, too innocent to know how to protect herself from developing an intention to ruin herself.
The music expresses this state of affairs very well, as Callas brings the whole package together. This is why it is especially beautiful and melancholy.
Sissel and Carmen Monarcha also stand out.
Also: Hayley Westenra here and here.
Thursday, April 03, 2008
The Maverick
Thanks for the Mavericklanche, Bill!
Folks, if you want to see what a real philosophy blog looks like just keep scrolling. I like the posts on metaethics, my favorite field of philosophy. Unlike Philosoblog, The Maverick has loads of epistemology and metaphysics for you. Plus, he often has great photos of the southwestern landscape. And yes, I did mean "'lanche." That's how popular his philosophy blog is, and deservedly so.
Thanks for the Mavericklanche, Bill!
Folks, if you want to see what a real philosophy blog looks like just keep scrolling. I like the posts on metaethics, my favorite field of philosophy. Unlike Philosoblog, The Maverick has loads of epistemology and metaphysics for you. Plus, he often has great photos of the southwestern landscape. And yes, I did mean "'lanche." That's how popular his philosophy blog is, and deservedly so.
Tuesday, April 01, 2008
Billy Budd (I)
Get this edition.
Captain Vere must send boys to their deaths. War is a fact, not a debatable proposition. We will send our good boys, and their instinctive and noble fighting spirit will get them killed, just as Billy's did him. And just as in Billy's case, the justice of their fate will be owing to the requirement of a society to defend itself and not to any inherent criminality of their acts.
We can if we like demonstrate to ourselves the need for our country to send good men to their deaths in order to protect the country. Vere argues carefully to his jury (a drumhead court-marshal) that Billy must hang. The problem is that sending Billy or any other decent young man to his death is an indecent act. It make one ill. It renders Vere a broken man.
Billy is an even better man than most, perhaps even Vere. He causes peace and harmony where he dwells. He accepts the sentence Vere hands down and blesses Vere. This expresses the position in which one finds oneself with regard to some soldiers: embarrassed by their superior character and infinite sacrifice.
In war one says, as Billy did on the occasion of his being impressed into the navy, "Goodbye to you, old rights of man." War overrides its participants' rights to be treated with decency and as worthy of respect. War is therefore a fact of the human predicament which is irreconcilable to the rationalistic position that the moral rules demanded by decency and dignity hold absolutely. They don't. We can, however, aim at accepting this reality and this justice as easily as Billy did. In his utterance, he did not mean that war violates our boys' right to life and liberty. And in fact it doesn't. It overrides them.
Of course, there are layers upon layers in Billy Budd. This is only one layer.
Get this edition.
Captain Vere must send boys to their deaths. War is a fact, not a debatable proposition. We will send our good boys, and their instinctive and noble fighting spirit will get them killed, just as Billy's did him. And just as in Billy's case, the justice of their fate will be owing to the requirement of a society to defend itself and not to any inherent criminality of their acts.
We can if we like demonstrate to ourselves the need for our country to send good men to their deaths in order to protect the country. Vere argues carefully to his jury (a drumhead court-marshal) that Billy must hang. The problem is that sending Billy or any other decent young man to his death is an indecent act. It make one ill. It renders Vere a broken man.
Billy is an even better man than most, perhaps even Vere. He causes peace and harmony where he dwells. He accepts the sentence Vere hands down and blesses Vere. This expresses the position in which one finds oneself with regard to some soldiers: embarrassed by their superior character and infinite sacrifice.
In war one says, as Billy did on the occasion of his being impressed into the navy, "Goodbye to you, old rights of man." War overrides its participants' rights to be treated with decency and as worthy of respect. War is therefore a fact of the human predicament which is irreconcilable to the rationalistic position that the moral rules demanded by decency and dignity hold absolutely. They don't. We can, however, aim at accepting this reality and this justice as easily as Billy did. In his utterance, he did not mean that war violates our boys' right to life and liberty. And in fact it doesn't. It overrides them.
Of course, there are layers upon layers in Billy Budd. This is only one layer.
Monday, March 31, 2008
Brandt and Who's Responsible for War
Brandt's article (see the post just below this one) leaves out of discussion the point about which side in a war is responsible for the war: which side is the wrongful aggressor. The moral obligations of the innocent side depend on the fact that it is the victim and not the perpetrator. But Brandt ignores this. When you ignore this, it doesn't matter what follows.
In the middle section of the article, Brandt's tactic is to show that his utilitarian position entails various common-sense moral judgments. Of course, these are the utility-promoting ones, and it shouldn't come as a surprise that the many utility-promoting judgments embraced by common-sense ethics are entailed (or "explained," as if they needed explanation) by utilitarianism. So, the tactic has no success is supporting Brandt's utilitarianism.
The kinds of common-sense judgments entailed by utilitarianism are three. There are (1.) humanitarian restrictions on doing harm to the enemy when no military gain will result from it, (2.) humanitarian restrictions that might exact a military cost, and (3.) humanitarian restrictions that will entail military losses. Utilitarianism and common-sense agree perfectly that violence done to the enemy for no foreseeable gain is wrong; but utilitarianism is not needed to explain that. Brandt runs into trouble with the other two kinds of judgments.
When refraining from the use of military violence might require foregoing a military gain, it might still be obligatory to refrain, and reasons of utility will be at play here. One ought not destroy 500,000 million enemy souls just in order to increase the chance of keeping a insignificant stronghold occupied by one of one's platoons. There utilitarianism and common-sense agree. But Brandt never proves that non-utilitarian moral principles shouldn't come into deliberations such as this, as well. Perhaps Brandt looks down his nose at the hodge-podge of common-sense moral principles and wishes to substitute for them something simpler. But why anyone would want to do that, though it seems to be the primary goal of many normative moral theorists, is a mystery to me. A pet theory has no weight at all against a common-sense moral judgment. Common-sense moral judgments are the only data normative moral theory has, and there is never any reason for the theorist to wax theory-driven.
Let's take a closer look. Brandt says that when the outcome of the war is certain, the side that everyone knows will win has an obligation to refrain from taking tolls on the enemy "so heavy as to be out of proportion to the estimated cost of further struggle to both sides." If causing Japan to surrender by invading it would have cost the lives of only five American soldiers and a few hundred Japanese, then the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have been wrong. That's common sense, and here again common sense and utilitarianism are in harmony. However, suppose that subduing Japan would have cost, say, 10,000 American soldiers' lives. Then, should the U.S. have refrained from the bombings? No. The point is that Japan was at fault for starting the war. When you unjustly start a war, you should accept that your victim has a right to protect 10,000 of its souls from your violence, even if this costs you 150,000 of your own souls. Brandt provides no evidence that utility alone should be the guide in these cases. He says only that it is in both sides' interest to refrain from this sort of disproportional harm. Well, it isn't in the interest of the side that stands to lose the 10,000. Behind the veil of ignorance we can reasonably maintain that any wrongly and unprovokedly attacked country has the right to finish the enemy off without needlessly losing 10,000 of its citizens. There is no reason that an impartial being standing behind the veil should agree not to reserve this right when he steps from behind the veil.
Behind the veil, the right not to suffer wrongful and unprovoked attack has weight. The right not to sacrifice one's citizens for the sake of maximizing net utility counts. Veil theorists, such as Brandt and Rawls, want to imagine what an impartial and rational being with no morals would choose behind the veil. They imagine different things and nobody should care what they imagine, because nobody should care which morals a person without morals would choose.
Brandt's article (see the post just below this one) leaves out of discussion the point about which side in a war is responsible for the war: which side is the wrongful aggressor. The moral obligations of the innocent side depend on the fact that it is the victim and not the perpetrator. But Brandt ignores this. When you ignore this, it doesn't matter what follows.
In the middle section of the article, Brandt's tactic is to show that his utilitarian position entails various common-sense moral judgments. Of course, these are the utility-promoting ones, and it shouldn't come as a surprise that the many utility-promoting judgments embraced by common-sense ethics are entailed (or "explained," as if they needed explanation) by utilitarianism. So, the tactic has no success is supporting Brandt's utilitarianism.
The kinds of common-sense judgments entailed by utilitarianism are three. There are (1.) humanitarian restrictions on doing harm to the enemy when no military gain will result from it, (2.) humanitarian restrictions that might exact a military cost, and (3.) humanitarian restrictions that will entail military losses. Utilitarianism and common-sense agree perfectly that violence done to the enemy for no foreseeable gain is wrong; but utilitarianism is not needed to explain that. Brandt runs into trouble with the other two kinds of judgments.
When refraining from the use of military violence might require foregoing a military gain, it might still be obligatory to refrain, and reasons of utility will be at play here. One ought not destroy 500,000 million enemy souls just in order to increase the chance of keeping a insignificant stronghold occupied by one of one's platoons. There utilitarianism and common-sense agree. But Brandt never proves that non-utilitarian moral principles shouldn't come into deliberations such as this, as well. Perhaps Brandt looks down his nose at the hodge-podge of common-sense moral principles and wishes to substitute for them something simpler. But why anyone would want to do that, though it seems to be the primary goal of many normative moral theorists, is a mystery to me. A pet theory has no weight at all against a common-sense moral judgment. Common-sense moral judgments are the only data normative moral theory has, and there is never any reason for the theorist to wax theory-driven.
Let's take a closer look. Brandt says that when the outcome of the war is certain, the side that everyone knows will win has an obligation to refrain from taking tolls on the enemy "so heavy as to be out of proportion to the estimated cost of further struggle to both sides." If causing Japan to surrender by invading it would have cost the lives of only five American soldiers and a few hundred Japanese, then the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have been wrong. That's common sense, and here again common sense and utilitarianism are in harmony. However, suppose that subduing Japan would have cost, say, 10,000 American soldiers' lives. Then, should the U.S. have refrained from the bombings? No. The point is that Japan was at fault for starting the war. When you unjustly start a war, you should accept that your victim has a right to protect 10,000 of its souls from your violence, even if this costs you 150,000 of your own souls. Brandt provides no evidence that utility alone should be the guide in these cases. He says only that it is in both sides' interest to refrain from this sort of disproportional harm. Well, it isn't in the interest of the side that stands to lose the 10,000. Behind the veil of ignorance we can reasonably maintain that any wrongly and unprovokedly attacked country has the right to finish the enemy off without needlessly losing 10,000 of its citizens. There is no reason that an impartial being standing behind the veil should agree not to reserve this right when he steps from behind the veil.
Behind the veil, the right not to suffer wrongful and unprovoked attack has weight. The right not to sacrifice one's citizens for the sake of maximizing net utility counts. Veil theorists, such as Brandt and Rawls, want to imagine what an impartial and rational being with no morals would choose behind the veil. They imagine different things and nobody should care what they imagine, because nobody should care which morals a person without morals would choose.
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Brandt, Utilitarianism, and the Rules of War
In "Utilitarianism and the Rules of War" (1972) Richard B. Brandt, like any rationalist, misconstrues a constraint on rule acceptance as a source of rules. Of course, any acceptable moral rule must meet the constraint that they be acceptable to impartial and rational people; no acceptable moral rule would be unacceptable to them. But there is a large range of mutually inconsistent moral rules that would be acceptable to them. The constraint simply won't determine which rules are right.
Brandt believes that only his preferred rules would be acceptable to them: utilitarian rules. His reason is that it is in the interests of anyone self-interested, impartial and rational to prefer these when he doesn't yet know who he will be: when he is behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. If we have an altruistic fellow behind the veil, then he should choose utilitarian rules, too, as they are in others' interests. Utilitarian rules maximize the chance of maintaining his own and others' welfare. So, they are the right moral rules.
There are two problems with this position. One is that Rawls draws different conclusions when he steps behind the veil. He chooses rules that would minimize the maximum loss of welfare he might suffer. This minimax position is inconsistent with Brandt's utilitarianism. So, apparently the impartial and rational space behind the veil does not lead to the determinate conclusions even amongst those philosophers who claim that it does. When the experts' divinations disagree, one concludes that divination doesn't work.
Also, an impartial and rational agent can also prefer not to treat a few people badly as a means of maximizing the net welfare. Or he may not wish to allow the aggressor in the war mercy sufficient to maximize utility because such mercy comes at the expense of the aggressor's innocent victims. Or he may make distinctions between the treatment of enemy non-combatants and the treatment of enemy soldiers on the grounds of decency, knowing full well that these distinctions may reduce his chances of survival when he emerges from behind the veil and enters the war. There is a variety of moral principles which can come into impartial and rational decision making. This is because there is a variety of anti-utilitarian moral principles that impartial agents might embrace. This is the simple fact that refutes the Rawlsian (Kantian) theory of moral deliberation.
Brandt himself admits that there will be a restriction on the rules. The only acceptable rules are those that are consistent with any country having the right to exert force sufficient to overpower the enemy. For it is a fact that no country will not exert such force. But if there is this restriction issuing from human nature, why are there not more restrictions issuing from human nature, such as those I've listed above? Brandt allowed for one, and I listed three. There are more. This is sufficient to refute Brandt's case for utilitarianism. All attempts to divine moral principles out of the thin air of the space behind the veil fail. They have done so since the first emerged with Kant. Only human beings can determine moral rules, not abstract agents.
In "Utilitarianism and the Rules of War" (1972) Richard B. Brandt, like any rationalist, misconstrues a constraint on rule acceptance as a source of rules. Of course, any acceptable moral rule must meet the constraint that they be acceptable to impartial and rational people; no acceptable moral rule would be unacceptable to them. But there is a large range of mutually inconsistent moral rules that would be acceptable to them. The constraint simply won't determine which rules are right.
Brandt believes that only his preferred rules would be acceptable to them: utilitarian rules. His reason is that it is in the interests of anyone self-interested, impartial and rational to prefer these when he doesn't yet know who he will be: when he is behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. If we have an altruistic fellow behind the veil, then he should choose utilitarian rules, too, as they are in others' interests. Utilitarian rules maximize the chance of maintaining his own and others' welfare. So, they are the right moral rules.
There are two problems with this position. One is that Rawls draws different conclusions when he steps behind the veil. He chooses rules that would minimize the maximum loss of welfare he might suffer. This minimax position is inconsistent with Brandt's utilitarianism. So, apparently the impartial and rational space behind the veil does not lead to the determinate conclusions even amongst those philosophers who claim that it does. When the experts' divinations disagree, one concludes that divination doesn't work.
Also, an impartial and rational agent can also prefer not to treat a few people badly as a means of maximizing the net welfare. Or he may not wish to allow the aggressor in the war mercy sufficient to maximize utility because such mercy comes at the expense of the aggressor's innocent victims. Or he may make distinctions between the treatment of enemy non-combatants and the treatment of enemy soldiers on the grounds of decency, knowing full well that these distinctions may reduce his chances of survival when he emerges from behind the veil and enters the war. There is a variety of moral principles which can come into impartial and rational decision making. This is because there is a variety of anti-utilitarian moral principles that impartial agents might embrace. This is the simple fact that refutes the Rawlsian (Kantian) theory of moral deliberation.
Brandt himself admits that there will be a restriction on the rules. The only acceptable rules are those that are consistent with any country having the right to exert force sufficient to overpower the enemy. For it is a fact that no country will not exert such force. But if there is this restriction issuing from human nature, why are there not more restrictions issuing from human nature, such as those I've listed above? Brandt allowed for one, and I listed three. There are more. This is sufficient to refute Brandt's case for utilitarianism. All attempts to divine moral principles out of the thin air of the space behind the veil fail. They have done so since the first emerged with Kant. Only human beings can determine moral rules, not abstract agents.
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